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    <title>Gmane</title>
    <url>http://gmane.org/img/gmane-25t.png</url>
    <link>http://gmane.org</link>
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  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8207">
    <title>A DEFINITION OF SIGN</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8207</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;"Signs for us are sensible objects because human knowledge as discursive originates from the senses. It can be said more generally that a sign is anything generally known in which something other than itself is presented, and this is the case with an intellectual concept in presenting the intelligibility of any object, or with a percept presenting the desirability or undesirability of any object."
 
John Deely, THE FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING, PAGE 337
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" 
to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-l&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to peirce-l but to iulist&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe peirce-l" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .


&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Moore</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-25T07:30:50</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8204">
    <title>Soul Lips Ism</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8204</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;
http://theodoragoss.tumblr.com/post/23717015911/beauty-by-charles-baudelaire

&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Jon Awbrey</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-25T04:28:10</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8199">
    <title>Fwd: Peirce Society Facebook Group</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8199</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700

*** *** *** ***
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" 
to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-l&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to peirce-l but to iulist&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe peirce-l" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .


&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Richmond</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-23T16:08:09</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8197">
    <title>Conference: The American Style in Philosophy</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8197</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;The American Style in Philosophy

*Two Day International Conference*
*June 11th-12th, 2012*
*University College Dublin*

Supported by:
The IRCHSS (“New Ideas” Award in the Humanities and Social Sciences)
UCD School of Philosophy
UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies
International Journal of Philosophical Studies
 http://www.american-voice.org/Conference Outline

In comparing the styles of American and French philosophical writing, James
Conant has noted the characteristic “diffidence” of writers like Thoreau
when compared to the characteristic “brilliance” of intellectuals like
Derrida. Conant provocatively suggests that this Parisian brilliance most
typically registers “what is now taken as the sound of philosophy”. “The
sound of much of the language in Thoreau’s *Walden*”, he writes, “is apt to
strike a reader – at least on a first encounter – as not particularly
philosophical at all, as not even trying to sound like philosophy”.
(Conant, J., “Cavell and the Concept of &lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Khadimir</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-23T15:12:22</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8193">
    <title>Testing Archive Links To See If They Are Public</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8193</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;
https://iulist.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2012-05/msg00065.html

&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Jon Awbrey</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-22T04:38:58</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8191">
    <title>A Petition to Require Free Access over the Internet to Scientific Journal Articles Arising from Taxpayer-Funded Research</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8191</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;A Petition to Require Free Access over the Internet to Scientific Journal Articles Arising from Taxpayer-Funded Research

❝We believe in the power of the Internet to foster innovation, research, and education. Requiring the published results 
of taxpayer-funded research to be posted on the Internet in human and machine readable form would provide access to 
patients and caregivers, students and their teachers, researchers, entrepreneurs, and other taxpayers who paid for the 
research. Expanding access would speed the research process and increase the return on our investment in scientific 
research.

❝The highly successful Public Access Policy of the National Institutes of Health proves that this can be done without 
disrupting the research process, and we urge President Obama to act now to implement open access policies for all 
federal agencies that fund scientific research.❞

Register (if not already) and sign on this page:

https://wwws.whitehouse.gov/petitions#!/petition/require-free-access-over-i&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Jon Awbrey</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-22T04:04:32</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8190">
    <title>test 2 ignore/delete</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8190</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;test 2 ignore/delete
 
 
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
 
718 482-5700
```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
IF POSSIBLE PLEASE CC messages to: gary.richmond&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;gmail.com

-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" 
to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-l&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to peirce-l but to iulist&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe peirce-l" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .


&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Richmond</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-21T22:18:10</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8189">
    <title>test: ignore/delete</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8189</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;test: ignore/delete

-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" 
to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-l&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to peirce-l but to iulist&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe peirce-l" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .


&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Richmond</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-21T22:09:06</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8180">
    <title>trial</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8180</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" 
to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-l&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to peirce-l but to iulist&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe peirce-l" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .


&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Moore</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-18T11:08:04</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8178">
    <title>Inquiry Live and Logic Live</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8178</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;Peircers,

Prompted by observations I had been making over a long period of time about
the problems of fragmentation and increasing insularity in web communities,
and inspired in part by discussions I had been having with Michel Bauwens
of the P2P (Peer2Peer) Foundation, I started a project a few years back
that was intended to explore architectural solutions to these problems
while developing a body of useful content in the process.

As I reflected on the architecture that might be demanded by the task,
at least to make a good beginning at organizing the available resources,
it took on the shape of an elliptical orbit, with content nodes revolving
about two ruling foci, called “Inquiry” and “Logic”, respectively.

Still exploring the possibilities of architecture and information in parallel,
I created a couple of focal wiki pages called “Inquiry Live” and “Logic Live”.

• http://mywikibiz.com/Inquiry_Live
• http://mywikibiz.com/Logic_Live

The “Live” bit indicated a couple of design &lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Jon Awbrey</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-17T16:32:13</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8176">
    <title>Roger that</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8176</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;May the list prosper! S
*ShortFormContent at Blogger* &amp;lt;http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/&amp;gt;
&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Stephen C. Rose</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-17T15:23:09</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8175">
    <title>Important: The PEIRCE-L as migrated to the IU List system</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8175</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;The PEIRCE-L list has been migrated to a new environment, the IU List System. This is because the current LISTSERV is being discontinued.

1) Please check your Junk Mail folder to make sure that mail from the migrated list isn't being treated as SPAM.

2) Please use PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu instead of PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;listserv.iupui.edu when sending to the list. 

3) We expect that list members' current individual settings will be be preserved. Information will be forthcoming on how to modify settings, view archives, etc. The peirce-l page at Arisbe will be modified accordingly.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.


Bill Stuckey
Network &amp;amp; Information Systems
IUPUI School of Liberal Arts
Cavanaugh Hall 001C
425 University Blvd.
Indianapolis, IN 46202
317-274-2978
wstuckey&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iupui.edu 



&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Stuckey, William E</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-17T14:39:22</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8174">
    <title>ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE TO ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS OR SKEPTICISM</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8174</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;From:Benjamin Udell &amp;lt;budell&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;nyc.rr.com&amp;gt;
To: owner-peirce-l&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;listserv.iupui.edu 
Cc: PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2012 7:12 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Title Corrected: ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE TO ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
-----------------------------
Gary M., list,
Benjamin Udell: On solipsism: If you find an "other," unexpected and uncontrolled by you, even in your internal world, then that seems even more reason for rejecting solipsism, whereas it seems to lead you to solipsism as a psychological truth. 
-------------------------------
Gary Moore: Yes, just as a psychological truth – but a most fundamental one.
---------------------------------
Benjamin Udell: Yet to find this interior other is to find that there isn't even a part of the appearance-world that is securely 'self' rather than 'other', so how much less likely is it that the whole appearing world is really oneself only, solipse, without other?
-------------------------
Gary Moore: Yes, exactly: none! Langua&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Moore</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-17T10:28:08</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8173">
    <title>NECESSARY TO UNENTANGLING PEIRCE=?utf-8?Q?=E2=80=99S_?= NEED FOR HISTORICAL RESPONSIBLITY</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8173</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;NECESSARY TO UNENTANGLING PEIRCE’S NEED FOR HISTORICAL RESPONSIBLITY IN THE GORDIAN KNOT IN HIS “THE ETHICS OF TERMINOLOGY”
Deely’s THE FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING, a huge book, is an attempt to deal with Peirce’s statement, pg. 263, THE ESSENTIAL PIERCE, “Thirdly, the progress of science cannot gofar except by collaboration; or, to speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds” which John Deely takes to an even more extreme extent, but justified by Peirce, on pp. 662-667. This abridged section on Aquinas and his sign terminology actually indicates the primary turning point of the doctrine of signs from something merely off-hand in Augustine to actual usage in Aquinas. The question came up for me in Deely’s justification of putting Heidegger in Peirce’s line of thought which I here took time out to make a real ‘first’ to untangle the web of Aquinas’ semiotics which Deely says is necessary to understand the semiotic line of thought through Aquinas to Po&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Moore</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-17T08:12:27</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8172">
    <title>Modus Dolens</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8172</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/05/10/modus-dolens/

;}

&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Jon Awbrey</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-16T18:48:10</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8169">
    <title>Peirce forum migration on 17-May-2012</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8169</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;PEIRCE-L subscribers,

On 17-May-2012, the PEIRCE-L list will be migrating to a new environment, the IU List System. This is because the current LISTSERV is being discontinued.

1) Once the list has been migrated, please check your Junk Mail folder to make sure that mail from the migrated list isn't being treated as SPAM.

2) Once the list has been migrated, please use PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iulist.iupui.edu instead of PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;listserv.iupui.edu when sending to the list. We'll send a message to the list when it has been migrated, but we wanted you to be prepared for the change.

3) We expect that list members' current individual settings will be be preserved. Information will be forthcoming on how to modify settings, view archives, etc. The peirce-l page at Arisbe will be modified accordingly.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.


Bill Stuckey
Network &amp;amp; Information Systems
IUPUI School of Liberal Arts
Cavanaugh Hall 001C
425 University Blvd.
Indianapolis, IN 46202
317-274-2978
wstuckey&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;iupui.edu 

-------------&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Stuckey, William E</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-15T17:33:01</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8168">
    <title>Title Corrected: ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE TO ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8168</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;



Subject: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
[peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS 
Gary MooreFrom: Benjamin Udell &amp;lt;budell&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;nyc.rr.com&amp;gt; To: "PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU" &amp;lt;PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU&amp;gt; Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2012 11:44 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS Benjamin Udell: I don't
2:31 AM
Monday, May 14, 2012 2:31 AM    
From:Benjamin Udell &amp;lt;budell&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;nyc.rr.com&amp;gt;
To: "PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU" &amp;lt;PEIRCE-L&amp;lt; at &amp;gt;LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU&amp;gt; 
Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2012 11:44 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
Benjamin Udell: I don't find anything on ens ut primum cognitum at Arisbe, and I find very little about it in connection with Peirce on the Internet. 
-----------------
Gary Moore: This maybe is a Deely ‘thing’ although he makes associations repetitively in his books between the ‘act’ of “Firstness&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Moore</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-15T10:30:08</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8146">
    <title>ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8146</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;To whom it may concern:
In trying to muddle through the storm tossed flotsam and jetsam of John Deely’s explanation of Peirce’s “The Ethics of Terminology” I have discovered the only slightly less over-involved muddle of Peirce’s original. There is the plea for a special terminology as opposed to popular terminology or language. The justification of this is ‘precision’. But such ‘precision’ needing a special terminology whether to a greater or lesser degree divorced from popular language simply sets up a ‘privileged’ standpoint of using language that is not judged by the actual rough and tumble usage of real language in real usage. This is not ‘precision’, this is mystification. The success or failure of any idea what-so-ever is its usage in ordinary discourse. Once established on that plain where an approximate but real general understanding is achieved, then one can seek precision of precisely those terms as really used in a living language. That is
 the only viable and workable d&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Gary Moore</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-11T15:24:23</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8145">
    <title>Mathematics, Phenomenology, Normative Science, Metaphysics</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8145</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

I began to be curious about the recurrence of the following passage
from Peirce in internet discussions over the last dozen years or so.

Syllabus : Classification of Sciences (1.180-202, G-1903-2b)
• http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm

  o---------------------------------------------------------------------o
  |                                                                     |
  |                                  o Metaphysics                      |
  |                                 /|                                  |
  |                                / |                                  |
  |                               /  |                                  |
  |            Normative Science o   |                                  |
  |                             / \  |                                  |
  |                            /   \ |                                  |
  |                           /     \|       &lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Jon Awbrey</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-11T14:54:10</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8141">
    <title>Frege against the Booleans</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8141</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;



List, Irving, John et. al., Sluga (Frege against the Booleans; Notre Dame Journal of Formal logic 1987)) places great emphasis upon the priority principle in Frege, which stresses that the judgement is epistemically, ontologically, and methodologically primary. He tries to show that Frege thought that Schroder's view exhibited a bias towards the methodological primacy of concepts by drawing on Schroder's Introductory parts of the Algebra of Logic. I think the central claim of the Sluga  paper is that this supposed bias of the Booleans towards abstraction and the treatment of concepts as extensions of classes leads to a confusion over the relation between "abstract" or "pure" logic and predicate logic. How this is, is not always easy to see, but the segmenting of the judgement relation does seem to lead to a problem in seeing the abstract logic as a special case of predicate logic. How serious any of this is I don't know.  For instance, Mitchell took issue with a "Mr. Peirce" for speaking of a "universe o&lt;/pre&gt;</description>
    <dc:creator>Jim Willgoose</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-10T21:30:12</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8127">
    <title>The Pragmatic Party</title>
    <link>http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8127</link>
    <description>&lt;pre&gt;Not sure what form a party based on a method rather than a set of axioms would look like, but given the current state of foolishness in American politics, we obviously can do worse.
 
http://newsminer.com/view/full_story/18442942/article-Pragmatism-needed-?instance=home_opinion_letters_to_editor
 
Robert Eckert

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    <dc:creator>Robert Eckert</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2012-05-03T20:43:31</dc:date>
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