http://blog.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods hourly 1 1901-01-01T00:00+00:00 http://gmane.org/img/gmane-25t.png http://gmane.org http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22128 <pre>I keep coming back to the basic question of terminology in SODA. If the voters delegate their votes, what is the verb for the thing the candidates do with those delegated votes? I want to be able to say: "Candidate A is first in the XXXXXing order, so she XXXXXs YYYY for candidates B and C." YYYY is probably "delegated approvals"; what is XXXX? Assign? Cast? Commit? Fill in? Inject? Or is one word not enough, and you need a phrase like "delegated adding order"? I'd love it if someone could help me find a better option. Even if not, I need more opinions before I can confidently choose one of the above options. Jameson ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info </pre> Jameson Quinn 2012-05-25T14:06:37 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22124 <pre>The co-operation/defection problem is nothing in comparison to the problems of Plurality. By comparison, to just have, for a problem, the C/D problem would be more like not having a problem at all. Think of it as a nuisance, as opposed to a disasterous distortion that thoroughly conceals public wishes. The reason why I emphasize it anyway is because it's the only Approval problem worthy of the name. That's why I say that you can't significantly improve on Approval unless you gain defection-resistance. And I'll say again that if you think that Condorcet doesn't have the C/D problem, then just try Condorcet in the 27,24,49 example and the 33,32,34 example. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info </pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-24T19:49:28 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22122 <pre>Juho: I'm not going to reply to the repetition and vagueness that constitutes the rest of your post, but I'll answer this silly question that you've asked. Your question is silly partly because it asks for a definition that I've given here many times. But also because it asks if I meant something different from what I said. ("Silly" is the polite word for the content of the post to which I'm replying,and your other ones). I'd said: beat the unacceptables, then rank Compromise alone in 1st place. Maybe one can build an implementable strategy from this one. Some further definitions are however needed. What is the definition of and how will the voters determine if the election is a u/a election? [endquote] I've many times given definitions of a u/a election. An election is u/a for you if, for you, it has one or more unacceptable candidates who might win. And when someone objects that "unacceptable" is undefined, this is what I've said: An election is, for you, u/a if, for you, the candi</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-24T02:40:47 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22120 <pre>In SODA (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval), candidates must pre-declare their preferences among the other candidates, and their post-election approvals using votes delegated to them[1] must be consistent with these pre-declared preferences. As defined until now, those pre-declared preferences were partial orderings; that is, tied preferences were allowed. I have recently realize that if you require full preference orderings, SODA's criteria compliances improve significantly. Specifically, I strongly suspect (though I have not yet fully proven) that it meets all of the following: 1. FBC 2. There is always some semi-honest vote which meets participation (this is closely related to FBC, but not quite exactly just a stronger version of it) 3. Participation for up to 4 (5?) candidates 4. Consistency for up to 4 candidates 5. Condorcet and ISDA for up to 4 candidates 6. Local IIA (ie, IIA for the weakest alternative) for up to 5 (or possibly any number of???) candidates Sadly, this system still doesn't meet </pre> Jameson Quinn 2012-05-23T14:50:45 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22118 <pre>There are two completely different kinds of voting system reforms: 1. A completely different and new voting system 2. A minimal obvious fix to the current voting system Our Condorcetists at EM don't seem to get that distinction. The proposal to repeal Plurality's forced falsification rule follows obviously from an examination of what's wrong with Plurality, what Plurality's problem is. It's a type #2 reform, a minimal obvious fix to the current voting system. Which of those two kinds of reform proposals do you think would have a shorter expected enactment time? Which one could be considered as a voting-rights case? Condorcetists keep implying that they don't think that Approval would bring enough benefit, if I'm correctly guessing what they mean. I've told of the societal benefits that Approval would bring. I've told why that is. Anyone should feel free to tell why they believe that isn't so. But, for now, I'll just add that Myerson &amp; Weber have shown that Approval would quickly home in on the voter</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-22T22:18:11 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22111 <pre>When I said "Approval strategy is a difficult problem", I meant "Plurality strategy is a difficult problem." Let me repeat a little of what I said before: It's difficult because of the difficulty of getting an agreement, among those who want something better than the Democrats, regarding where they will combine their Plurality votes. That's why I suggest just voting sincerely, at least once, to actually find out what people want. In a presidential election, or a specified congressional election, or in specified state elections for specified unimportant offices. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info </pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-21T21:25:05 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22110 <pre>This is my reply to the remainder of Kristofer's post: Enough voters feel like this, and there would be a backlash. [endquote] Approval doesn't have a problem that Plurality doesn't have. You haven't shown one, you know. What you're saying above is just that you want a rank method, and that you want to express all of your preferences. If that's what you'd most like, then I recommend ICT. But just fixing Pluruality's ridiculous rating-falisification requirement would a lot more enactable, and would bring enormous societal improvement. You can dither forever, arguing about what is the ideal best. Dither all you want to, because the voting system reforms are being considered for here, not for there (No one claims that they're needed there). By the way, you spoke of how you vote in your PR elections. Since you've opened the door to that topic, then which party do you vote for? Kristofer says: Approval would in that respect then be like IRV: appearing sensible when you have two + minor parties, but in a</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-21T21:16:54 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22109 <pre>I'd said: Tricky isn’t the word for it. Try “unknown”, for most typical situations in Condorcet. But I told the expectation-maximizing strategy for a u/a election in which Compromise is the only acceptable perceived to be able to beat Worse. No, I’m not going to repeat it for you. Juho says: Since you don't want to point out any such strategy [endquote] I've only described it many times already, in replies to you. I'm not going to waste any more time repeating it for you. Juho says: I assume there is no such single strategy that you want to recommend for all regular voters. [endquote] To maximize expection with Condocet in a u/a election where Compromise is the only acceptable able to beat the unacceptables, rank Compromise alone in 1st place. I don't know what you mean by "all regular voters". The above strategy is for voters who perceive the above-desecribed conditions. If you want a general strategy for Condorcet, none is known. Juho says: Actually any working general strategy that</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-21T20:13:41 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22090 <pre>Of course, if there are 2 sets of candidates such that the merit difference within the two sets are negligible compared to the merit difference between the sets, then it's clear that defeating the worse set is more important than choosing among the better set. So I mis-spoke when I said that, in ICT, if there's a C/D problem, you should automatically vote E in 2nd place. All of {A,B,C,D,E} belong in 1st place. It's just that, in the special situations where in Approval, you'd not approve E, _that's_ when you'd move E down to 2nd place in ICT. The various C/D solutions in Approval can, in some circumstances, call for not approving E. Those would also call for demoting E to 2nd place in ICT. It's the same strategy response, in both methods, though it's different in the 2 methods. Obviously, that response is considerably milder and less costly in lCT. That's ICT's advantage over Approval. Of course, in a u/a election, certain conditions would have to be met before you'd let the C/D solutio</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-17T23:50:17 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22087 <pre>Kristofer: You expressed concern about uncertainty about how to vote in Approval. Let me re-word what I was trying to say about that: First, for simplicity let's say that you belong to a faction that all prefer and vote as you do. What you object to is that, in Approval, you don't know the way of voting by which your faction can get the best result possible. But what you _do_ know (if you like and choose strategic voting) is the way of voting that will maximize your expectation, based on what your expectation already is. (I've already said much about the better-than-expectation strategy of Approval) That's good enough. You can't expect to know exactly what ballot marks will give the best outcome for you. I emphasize that, in Condorcet, you don't know either of those things, _even if it's a u/a election_. Especially if it's a u/a election. And do you really think that our elections don't have unacceptable candidates who could win? .or two sets of candidates such that the merit differences</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-17T06:09:19 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22073 <pre>Here's a Condorcet method that I think retains CT's defection resistance while being closer to cloneproof. It is Smith,DSC (but I think DAC would also work). Consider Mike's usual C/D example: Sincere rankings are 33: A&gt;B 32: B&gt;A 34: C In DSC, {AB} is affirmed with a strength of 65. Then A wins because it's supported by one more voter than B. If the A-voters try to defect by voting only for A, that reduces the strength of {AB} to 32 so that C wins. Similarly, if the B-voters try to defect by voting only for B, that reduces the strength of {AB} to 33 so that C still wins. If all the clones are in the Smith set, this Smith,D*C resists clones. However, it might be possible to set up an example where only some of the clones are in the Smith set. I'm not sure. One could also make an ICT analog. Call the ICT version of the Smith set, ISmith. Then ISmith,DSC and ISmith,DAC could be constructed. Also note that one pays a bit for the resistance in that the method no longer picks the optimal candidate</pre> Kristofer Munsterhjelm 2012-05-14T22:13:01 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22065 <pre> In my most recent 2 postings, I've tried to somehow get through to EM members regarding the matter of feasible significant improvement. We really have been talking about entirely different subjects. Sure, it was obvious from past experience that that effort was almost surely a waste of time, but I felt that I should make one more effort in that direction. That additional effort to get through consisted of my two previous postings. All that's to say on the subject has been said now. I said that I reply to all, but there would have to be a clear and specific statement or question that calls for an answer. I didn't find that in Paul's or Robert's posting. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info </pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-13T20:30:26 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22062 <pre>Condorcetists: You want to quibble forever about which rank-count is the best. You object that Approval doesn't let you help your 1st and 2nd choices against your last choice, while still helping your 1st choice against your 2nd choice. But the _big_ benefit starts when everyone can support their 1st and 2nd choices at all. Plurality very effectively puts a gag on everyone who would like something better than the corrupt sleazes that your tv offers as "the two choices". "We have to hold our nose and vote for the lesser-evil [Democrat], so that we don't waste our vote." Do you have any idea how things would be if everyone could actually support their favorites, and without having to try to guess on which one the other similar voters would be combining their support? Do you understand the difference between "liked" and "unliked"? And what would happen if everyone could support whom and what they actually like best? Do you have any idea how far-reaching the resulting changes would be? No, I'm not sayin</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-13T01:04:31 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22061 <pre>Condordet's method (including Kemeny) is of some non-practical mathematical interest, as a possible answerto the question "How should we count sincere rankings?" I have no criticism of that abstract and non-practical study. In the real world, however, we can't assume sincere rankings. Strategy must be considered. Methods' strategy problems must be considered. This makes the real world, public political elections, voting system choice an entirely different problem, as opposed to the academic debate over the best way to count sincere rankings. I've argued that FBC failure is the seriously societally-damaging criterion-failure, and I've told my justifications for that claim. Additionally, I've mentioned the co-operation/defection problem, or chicken-dilemma, which makes nonsens of any claim that Condorcet gets rid of strategy need in the real world. So, I suggest that it's important that we keep it straight which discussion we're participating in: The academic question of how best to count sincere rankin</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-11T21:56:39 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22060 <pre>Of course the way to define u/a for criteria would be in terms of votes. A definition of u/a for criteria: In a critrerion failure-example, an election is u/a for some particular voter V iff: The candidates can be divided into two sets, A and B, such that V votes all of the candidates in A over all of the candidates in B, and doesn't vote a preference within A or B unless the failure-example critrerion-writer can prove conclusively that it isn't possible to contive a configuration of ballots other than that of V, such that: .....V, by voting that particular preference within A or B, causes the winner to come from set B, where the winner would have come from set A if V hadn't voted .....that paraticular preference within A or B. [end of definition of u/a for criteria] An election is All-u/a if it is u/a for every voter in that election. [end of All-u/a definition] A tentative definition of u/a FBC: In an All-u/a election, FBC should never be violated. [end of tentative definition of u/a FBC] To que</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-11T21:31:12 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22059 <pre>Dear all, I inform you that my second popularization article (in French) on the mathematics of democracy has just been published online (free access) : http://images.math.cnrs.fr/Et-le-vainqueur-du-second-tour-est.html . Hoping that it will contribute to make people know better the research on electoral methods, Kind regards, Rémi Peyre ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info </pre> Rémi 2012-05-11T14:49:02 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22058 <pre>Richard said that my reply to his "rebuttal" wasn't credible because I only repeated from my article. For one thing, that isn't correct. Though in one part of my counter-rebuttal, I spoke of optimizations resulting from the strategies listed in my article, I also questioned other things that Richard had said, without repeating from my article. Additionally, though my article listed some Approval strategies, it _didn't_ list all of the optimizations that I mentioned in my counter-rebuttal. So my mention of those optimizations were not repetition from the article. Anyway, as I've already said, when Richard claimed that Approval would have results that would make people want to go back to Plurality, it was called-for for me to say something about Approval's results. That justified my mention of those optimizations. Richard has never supported his claims regarding Approval or my article. As I said, vagueness, sloppiness, unaccountability and failure to support his statements are his standard tactic. Now, to</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-10T19:43:14 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22057 <pre>I emphasize that I don't know if u/a FBC makes a satisfactory guarantee. With it, FBC must be complied with only if the election is u/a to everyone. So, someone wanting to write a failure-example would have to devise an example in which, for everyone, there are 2 sets of candidates such that hir preferences within the sets are negligibly weak in comparison to hir preference between the sets. And there must not be anything that positively rules out a win in the less-preferred set. I don't know if satisfying that criterion would guarantee that there couldn't be societally-damaging favorite-burial incentive. I don't know for sure if I could write a really precisely-worded u/a FBC, because I haven't previously written criteria that refer to preference-strength, or in which the premise contains a stipulation that a win in a certain set not be positively ruled out. And I don't know if Smith-Top would pass that criterion. But, as I said, the matter is of interest, because I consider FBC to be important, becaus</pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-10T18:55:16 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22052 <pre>First, a co-operation/defection problem example at the opposite extreme: Sincere preferences: 33: A&gt;B 32: B&gt;A 34: C Now, replying to Richard: Richard says: Instead of publishing my "rebuttal" as an article, here is what I suggest. Adrian, in his own words, can introduce Mike's article by saying that the article is about one of many voting methods [endquote] At no time did I say that Approval was the only votinlg method. Richard continues: and about one of many characteristics of voting methods (FBC). [endquote] My article mentioned that Approval doesn't give favorite-burial incentive, and tells why that's important, but the revised version, the one that was published, makes no mention of the name "FBC". Richard thinks that I should explain that there are other properties by which to evaluate and compare methods, but I didn't say or imply that there weren't. I recommend that anyone should feel free, when proposing or describing a method, to tell what desirable properties it has. ...as did </pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-08T21:59:50 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22051 <pre>Since Richard wants to make a "which one wins" comparison between FBC and Condorcet's Criterion (CC), then I'll remind him that, when FBC failure sufficiently makes its problem, CC compiance becomes quite meaningless and valueless. And there is good reason to believe, as described in my previous post, that Condorcet's FBC failure _will_ fully make its problem in our public elections. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info </pre> Michael Ossipoff 2012-05-08T18:46:35 http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/22049 <pre>Dear all, A few days ago, I sent an e-mail personally to Markus Schulze to ask him some information about himself, as the popularization article I am currently writing deals with his eponymous method and it would be far better if I could link the concepts explained to alive, real people. But Markus did not answer to me, probably because he does not check his e-mail box very often, or because my e-mail was taken for spam. As I am very late (the article is to appear on next Friday!), I do not have the time to wait any more for Makus' answer, so I write to all of you to ask for the desired information. Below are the questions I asked to Markus [*]. If one of you does know one or several answers, please send them to me. « - Which country are you from? - When were you born? (and thus how old were you when you devised your method) - What are you doing for a job now? - And what were you doing for a job when you devised your method? - Could you say a few words on the context in which you proposed your new idea: </pre> Rémi 2012-05-08T17:03:05 Search the mailing list at Gmane query http://search.gmane.org/?group=$group=gmane.politics.election-methods