gmane.politics.election-methods

SODA terminology: opinions wanted.

Jameson Quinn — 2012-05-25T14:06:37

I keep coming back to the basic question of terminology in SODA. If the
voters delegate their votes, what is the verb for the thing the candidates
do with those delegated votes? I want to be able to say: "Candidate A is
first in the XXXXXing order, so she XXXXXs YYYY for candidates B and C."
YYYY is probably "delegated approvals"; what is XXXX?

Assign? Cast? Commit? Fill in? Inject? Or is one word not enough, and you
need a phrase like "delegated adding order"?

I'd love it if someone could help me find a better option. Even if not, I
need more opinions before I can confidently choose one of the above options.

Jameson
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Co-operation/defection in perspective

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-24T19:49:28

The co-operation/defection problem is nothing in comparison to the problems
of Plurality. By comparison, to just have, for a problem, the C/D problem
would be more like not having a problem at all. Think of it as a nuisance,
as opposed to a disasterous distortion that thoroughly conceals public
wishes.

 

The reason why I emphasize it anyway is because it's the only Approval
problem worthy of the name. That's why I say that you can't significantly
improve on Approval unless you gain defection-resistance.

 

And I'll say again that if you think that Condorcet doesn't have the C/D
problem, then just try Condorcet in the 27,24,49 example and the 33,32,34
example.

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

 

 

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Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-24T02:40:47

Juho:

 

I'm not going to reply to the repetition and vagueness that constitutes the
rest of your post, but I'll answer this silly question that you've asked.
Your question is silly partly because it asks for a definition that I've
given here many times. But also because it asks if I meant something
different from what I said. ("Silly" is the polite word for the content of
the post to which I'm replying,and your other ones).

 

I'd said:

 

beat the unacceptables, then rank Compromise alone in 1st place.

 

Maybe one can build an implementable strategy from this one. Some further
definitions are however needed. What is the definition of and how will the
voters determine if the election is a u/a election?

 

[endquote]

 

I've many times given definitions of a u/a election. An election is u/a for
you if, for you, it has one or more unacceptable candidates who might win.
And when someone objects that "unacceptable" is undefined,  this is what
I've said: An election is, for you, u/a if, for you, the candidates can be
divided into two sets such that the merit differences within each set are
negligible in comparison to the merit difference between the sets.

 

For the purposes of criteria, I've defined u/a in terms of voting, in a way
that is consistent with the above definition involving 2 sets. And no, I
won't re-post it. It's among the discussion of the possibility of a u/a FBC
criterion, maybe roughly a week ago, give or take some days.

 

Juho says:

 

Also terms "compromise"

 

[endquote]

 

I refer Juho to a dictionary, if he wants to find out what "compromise"
means. 

 

I've been using "Compromise" as the name of a candidate in some of my
discussions, and in some of my criterion definitions. As such, for that
purpose, the word needn't be defined, because it is a name, not a term.

 

Juho says:

 

, "acceptable" and "unacceptable" have to be defined. 

 

[endquote]

 

As I've been saying, of the two sets referred to in the above-stated
definition, the "acceptable set" is the one that the voter in question
prefers to the other set. That other set is the "unacceptable set". An
acceptable candidate is a candidate in the acceptable set. An unacceptable
candidate is a candidate in the unacceptable set.

 

[endquote]

 

Does "rank Compromise alone in 1st place" mean lifting one of the candidates
in the ranked vote to first place while keeping the others as they are?

 

[endquote]

 

If Juho doesn't know what it means to rank a candidate alone in 1st place,
then I again refer him to a dictionary.

 

Actually, this part of Juho's post didn't deserve a reply either. I answered
it only because he's taken on a new tactic, one of asking for definitions. I
don't want anyone to

think that I'm not willing to supply definitions of terms that I use. But
the definitions Juho asked for were each from one of two types: Definitions
already posted by me; and definitions available in any dictionary.

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

 

 

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full-ranking SODA: FBC compliant

Jameson Quinn — 2012-05-23T14:50:45

In SODA (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval), candidates must pre-declare
their preferences among the other candidates, and their post-election
approvals using votes delegated to them[1] must be consistent with these
pre-declared preferences. As defined until now, those pre-declared
preferences were partial orderings; that is, tied preferences were
allowed. I have recently realize that if you require full preference
orderings, SODA's criteria compliances improve significantly. Specifically,
I strongly suspect (though I have not yet fully proven) that it meets all
of the following:

1. FBC
2. There is always some semi-honest vote which meets participation (this is
closely related to FBC, but not quite exactly just a stronger version of it)
3. Participation for up to 4 (5?) candidates
4. Consistency for up to 4 candidates
5. Condorcet and ISDA for up to 4 candidates
6. Local IIA (ie, IIA for the weakest alternative) for up to 5 (or possibly
any number of???) candidates

Sadly, this system still doesn't meet plain IIA for even 3 candidates.

Note of course that the "up to N candidates" mathematically, means "up to N
serious candidates" in practical terms. Real-world elections with more than
4 serious candidates are quite rare; and those that do exist are typically
non-partisan and non-ideological, and thus do not exhibit interesting
enough inter-candidate dynamics to result in the tightly-constrained
pathologies that are possible. So I'd bet that in practice, full-ranking
SODA would pass all of the above criteria over 99% of the time.

More to come on this, as I try to work through the relevant proofs.

Jameson

[1] I really wish I had better terminology for this, "approvals using votes
delegated to them" is a mouthful for what should ideally be a single word.
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Two completely different kinds of voting reforms. ICT vsCondorcet.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-22T22:18:11

There are two completely different kinds of voting system reforms:

1. A completely different and new voting system
2. A minimal obvious fix to the current voting system

Our Condorcetists at EM don't seem to get that distinction.

The proposal to repeal Plurality's forced falsification rule follows
obviously from an examination of what's wrong with Plurality, what
Plurality's problem is. It's a type #2 reform, a minimal obvious fix to the
current voting system.

Which of those two kinds of reform proposals do you think would have a
shorter expected enactment time? 

Which one could be considered as a voting-rights case?

Condorcetists keep implying that they don't think that Approval would bring
enough benefit, if I'm correctly guessing what they mean.

I've told of the societal benefits that Approval would bring. I've told why
that is. Anyone should feel free to tell why they believe that isn't so.

But, for now, I'll just add that Myerson & Weber have shown that Approval
would quickly home in on the voter median, and then stay there.

Do Condorcetists feel that electing candidates at the voter-median position
isn't good enough? 

Plurality's problem, which causes it to keep on electing, at voting
equilibrium, two unliked parties, will be gone when its forced falsification
rule is repealed.

ICT vs Condorcet:

Voting instructions for ICT can correctly say:

1. There absolutely cannot be any reason or need to vote someone over your
favorite. There can be no benefit from doing so.

2. Defection in the ABE is always a losing strategy. Support a mutual
majority that you need to beat someone whom you want to beat. Just counting
on their supporting your favorite, without mutuality, won't be enough, won't
work. Since other voters know this, you can feel safe in supporting that
mutual majority.

3. Offensive burial usually won't work.

Condorcet cannot promise #1 and #2.

Approval meets FBC, Intermediate FBC, and Strong FBC.
ICT meets FBC and Intermediate FBC.
Condorcet fails all three of those criteria.

Mike Ossipoff










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Typo. Plurality strategy, not Approval strategy,is a difficult problem.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-21T21:25:05

When I said "Approval strategy is a difficult problem", I meant "Plurality
strategy is a difficult problem."

Let me repeat a little of what I said before:

It's difficult because of the difficulty of getting an agreement, among
those who want something better than the Democrats, regarding where they
will combine their Plurality votes.

That's why I suggest just voting sincerely, at least once, to actually find
out what people want.

In a presidential election, or a specified congressional election, or in
specified state elections for specified unimportant offices.

Mike Ossipoff
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Kristofer, contd.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-21T21:16:54

This is my reply to the remainder of Kristofer's post:

Enough voters feel like this, and there would be a backlash.

[endquote]

Approval doesn't have a problem that Plurality doesn't have. You
haven't shown one, you know.

What you're saying above is just that you want a rank method, and that
you want to express all of your preferences.

If that's what you'd most like, then I recommend ICT.

But just fixing Pluruality's ridiculous rating-falisification
requirement would a lot more enactable, and would bring enormous
societal improvement.

You can dither forever, arguing about what is the ideal best. Dither
all you want to, because the voting system reforms are being
considered for here, not for there (No one claims that they're needed
there).

By the way, you spoke of how you vote in your PR elections. Since
you've opened the door to that topic, then which party do you vote
for?

Kristofer says:

Approval would in that respect then be like IRV: appearing sensible when
you have two + minor parties, but in a three-way race, the problems surface.

Nonsense. With only 2 parties, it's entirely irrelevant which voting
system is used. It's when there are more than two candidates that
Approval's
big advantages over Plurality and Condorcet are manifest.

 In contrast, in Condorcet the voters just rank.

[endquote]

...if they don't know what they're doing. Or if the election is 0-info
and non-u/a.

Kristofer says:

Black's theorem handles
the rest

[endquote]

Kristofer, do you know what "hand-waving" is? You're hand-waving.

Kristofer says:

 ** You seem to be more inclined to look at ballots in a strategic
manner in general, I think. For instance, when you said that you would
only use
a few ranks in (some Bucklin variant I don't remember), that struck me
as quite strange. Are not ranked ballots expressions of preferences? No
- not if they're primarily *strategic*.

[endquote]

That's right. If you're voting in your best instrumental interest,
then that's different from if you merely want to express your sincere
preferences.
Decide which it is that you want to do.

Kristofer says:

My initial puzzlement was at how
you directly jumped to the instrumental point of view.

[endquote]

American and British voters have shown that they nearly all vote
instrumentally, in order to help a "lesser-evil".

There are some times when non-instrumental voting is called for.

1. In some of the solutions to the defection problem.

2. In Plurality, where instrumental voting requires unavailable
information about where we should combine our support. Of course it
could be reasonably argued that our Plurality elections
are really  0-info, in which case sincere voting _is_ the
instrumentally best expectation-maximizing strategy.

Otherwise, yes, I would vote instrumentally.

Approval strategy is a difficult problem. What should we do? I tell
people to just vote for their genuine favorite. As I said, our
elections are really 0-info anyway,
and so sincere voting is the best instrumental strategy therefore.

If we could all vote sincerely in this year's Plurality election, then
we'd know where we stand, and what our best strategy is in subsequent
ones. But no, people
are going to do their usual lesser-evil giveaway.

I've suggested that we pick relatively unimportant state elections.
Have the non-Republocrat parties run in those elections, and let's use
those to find out the
actual numbers.

I've suggested that progressive parties and organizations do some
polling, nationally. The sample would be limited, but the results
could be
meaningfully aggregated for a national estimate. Count by ICT. Then,
give advice, to everyone who wants something better than the Democrat,
to vote for that ICT winner.

...or do a voting rights lawsuit to repeal Plurality's forced
falsification requirement. As I've said, the result is called
"Approval voting".

I'd vote instrumentally in Approval. Sincere and strategic voting
would be the same for me, because it is a u/a election.

In Plurality, if there is no organization, agreements or polling, I
believe in sincere voting.
Sincere voting is instrumentally optimal for Plurality in 0-info elections.

Mike Ossipoff
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Juho , 5/21/12, roughly 0800 UT

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-21T20:13:41

I'd said:

Tricky isn’t the word for it. Try “unknown”, for most typical situations in
Condorcet.

But I told the expectation-maximizing strategy for a u/a election in which
Compromise is the only acceptable perceived to be able to beat Worse. No,
I’m not going to repeat it for you.

Juho says:


Since you don't want to point out any such strategy

[endquote]

I've only described it many times already, in replies to you. I'm not going
to waste any more time repeating it for you.

Juho says:

 I assume there is no such single strategy that you want to recommend for
all regular voters.

[endquote]

To maximize expection with Condocet in a u/a election where Compromise is
the only acceptable able to beat the unacceptables, rank Compromise alone
in 1st place.

I don't know what you mean by "all regular voters". The above strategy is
for voters who perceive the above-desecribed conditions.
If you want a general strategy for Condorcet, none is known.

Juho says:

 Actually any working general strategy that regular voters or parties can
use will do, either for Approval or Condorcet, either expectation-maximizing
or other strategy that is expected to improve the outcome. But so far I
have thus not seen any (lots of u/a discussion though but no general
strategy for all situations).

[endquote]

No general strategy is known for Condordet. The general
expectation-maximizing strategy of Approval is the better-than-expectation
strategy.

Juho says:

I got the two numeric examples though. Thanks for them. At least one of
them didn't however seem to work well enough, so I assume that the theory
and strategy behind those examples is not quite well thought yet.

[endquote]

As usual you're vague. I have no idea what examples you're referring to. If
you want to say that one of them isn't good enough, then you need to
clearly specify it, and then tell what's wrong with it, and why you think
so.



But I fully admit that expectation-maximizing strategy isn’t known for
Condorcet in most typical situations. It isn’t that Condorcet doesn’t need
strategy. It’s just that you don’t know what the expectation-maximizing
strategy is. But don’t feel bad—no one else does either.




In theory there are cases where one could cheat the system. But in practice
sincerity is by far the best strategy that voters have in large elections
where voters make independent decisions. The challenge is to find practical
situations where regular voters, after hearing some poll results (and
possibly some poll based situation specific strategic advices by the
media), would have good reason to vote otherwise (in a way that they can
master an that is likely to improve the outcome).

[endquote]

I described one to you, and no, I’m not going to repeat it. I don’t have
time to keep repeating things for you.


Sorry, I don't recall, or maybe didn't identify the the general solution
when I read it. You might point that out to help my poor memory. :-)

[endquote]

No, sorry, I don't have time for that. I've repeated it enough already.  I
refer you to my previous replies.



I’ve abundantly and sufficiently discussed that. It’s time to just agree to
disagree.

Ok. My statement is pretty well covered above. My assumption is that you
wll stick to the claim that there are often working strategies in Condorcet

[endquote]

…unknown ones, yes. But I described a strategy for a particular situation,
showing that sometimes favorite-burial is optimal in Condorcet.


If you describe a theoretical vulnerability or a practical strategy for
some specific situation, and the strategy is intended for regular people or
parties, then it can be made a general and usable strategy by adding some
criteria that tell the voters when that strategy should be applied.

[endquote]

Fine. Then do so. Write a general strategy for Condorcet :-)


Juho says:

That would make the strategy a working strategy (although not necessarily a
strategy that would work often).

[endquote]

Then it wouldn't be a general strategy, would it.





, and voters would be foolish toassume that they can generally vote
sincerely.

[endquote]

Correct.







Two: In Approval, if you like strategy, I’ve given simple instructions for
determining the way of voting that maximizes your expectation. I’ve
described it for u/a elections,
………..and for non-u/a elections.

I'd be interested in the one (or ones) that the regular voters are supposed
to follow in real life Approvan elections.

[endquote]

Any one of them that they like, or any one of them that makes use of the
information, perception or feel possessed by the voter. Yes, in real life
Approval elections.

That was not an answer. A concrete strategy please.

[endquote]

No, actually that is an answer. I’ll repeat it again for you: Look at the
last part of my Approval article.  If you feel that some part of the
strategy suggestions there are insufficiently “concrete”, then tell me what
it is that you need more details about. Ask a specific question.


Ok, but which Approval article?

[endquote]

The one that I posted to EM. The one that is at Democracy Chronicles.






You said:

You mentioned also sincere approval of "approvable" canddates as a strategy
that could be recommended to the voters. Do you think Approval can handle
well situations where some voters or voter groups are strategic while some
are sincere?

[endquote]

It’s easy to show strategizers taking advantage of sincere suckers in Range
or Majority Judgment. Maybe you’re saying that you fear that if you approve
the candidates you like, then the supporters of one of them will take
advantage of you by approving the candidates that they perceive as
acceptable, above-mean, or better-than-expectation. Sorry, but I don’t see
it. If you think that there’s a problem there, then you need to explain
what and why.

Simple example:
2: A>B>>C
1: B>>A>C

If the first group of voters approves sincerely A and B, B will win. Ins't
this a good enough reason for the first group to vote strategically and
place the approval cutoff between the two potential winners? That is, if
they want to win and not just elect the most approved candidate.

[endquote]

If you’ve approved some candidates whom you like, and one of them wins,
then I guess that I’m not quite understanding what your problem is.

If, on the other hand, you prefer to vote strategically, then of course you
should do so.

Juho says:

The problem is that we usually talk about competitive political elections
where all the players want to win.

[endquote]

You need to clarify, with yourself, what you mean, what you want. Do you
mean that you only want your favorite to win? Then, in Approval, approve
hir only.

If you want to maximize your expection, I've told Approval strategy for
that purpose.

Juho says:

Few lines above you assumed that people would use their burying
possibilities to the maximum.

[endquote]

Available evidence indicates that many voters would do whatever it takes to
maximally help Democrat against Republican.

Juho says:

I don't understand why in this case voters would be indifferent with
respect to the outcome of the election.

[endquote]

If you're asking about favorite-burial need in Approval, there is none.
Those same voters wouldn't favorite-bury in Approval because it is
transparently obvious that there can be no reason to do so.

But if you're questioning the assumption that people wouldn't strategize in
Approval, I merely suggest voting for all whom you like. If you want to,
you can strategize. Suit yourself.

Juho says:

Maybe you recommend Approval as a good method for non-competitive elections.

[endquote]

...and for competitive elections.







As for the defection problem, we’ve discussed it before, and the fact that
Approval has ways of dealing with it, and the fact that Condorcet fully has
that  problem too.

Disagreed. I don't know how Approval can handle it.

[endquote]

I posted some solutions some months ago.  I’ll find that posting and
re-post it.


Thanks.


But my suggestions included Forest’s solution in which the A voters give to
B only enough approvals such that if C’s favoriteness-percentage is as
estimated, then the larger of {A,B} will win. In Approval that would be
done probabilistically. The A voters tell the B voters that they should do
the same, if they don’t want C to win, and if the A faction might be bigger
than the B faction. No, not perfect, due to imperfect predictive
information, but still helpful.


Without exactly knowing what the strategy is, I note that in practical
elections there may be some problems with making the voters vote in line
with the strategy.

[endquote]

The strategy is as described above. Any difficulty in following it would be
likewise encountered when it is needed in Condorcet.


One more thing in my mind. Regular voters may be interested only in the
outcome of this election and never mind if their opponents get angry.

[endquote]

Fine, with Tit-For-Tat in use, the B voters will keep defecting, and so
will the A voters. But the B voters will know that as soon as the
co-operate, so will the A voters.

Anyway, Forest's suggested solution has its effect in the current election.
The non-secretness of a faction's voting intentions is also relevent to the
current election.


This claim was just a reflection of your idea that Approval could "maximize
expectation".

[endquote]

Nonsense. We haven’t been speaking of some methods that maximize
expectation. We’ve been speaking of expectation-maximizing strategies.

It’s been established and agreed on EM that the strategies that I’ve
described do indeed maximize expectation in Approval.


"agreed on EM" :-)

[endquote]

Correct. And many special cases of, implementations of,  the
better-than-expectation strategy have been well-known for a long time in
the broader voting system discussion.

Juho says:

Are there multiple such strategies?

[endquote]

As I've already repeated for you many time, there is one
expectation-maximizing strategy for Approval: Vote for the candidates who
are better than expectation. That strategy can be implemented directly, or
via various implementations that are special cases of it.

This time, pay attention, because I'm not going to repeat that for you
again.


Juho says:

 Does that mean that each voter can pick his favourite, and they work well
in sync that way?

[endquote]

Yes to both questions. Pick whichever implementation you like or have the
information or intuitive feel for. Remember that they're just special cases
of the same strategy.






Maybe better to focus on concrerte practcal strategic vulnerabilities
(unless there is something more in this).

[endquote]

So focus on it then, instead of just making a vague reference to it.


What should I provide? I'm willing to be more concrete if you tell me what
you want.

[endquote]

In general, what you should provide is the specifics of what you mean. You
never do that, and no doubt you never will. That's why talking to you is a
waste of time.

In particular, in this instance, you speak of focusing on concrete
practical strategic vulnerabilities. I suggested that you specify and focus
on one.

Juho says:

I'd like you to point out concrete and practical strategies for real life
elections for both or either of the methods.

[endquote]

I've written this sentence many times for you: I've pointed out a practical
expectation-maximizing strategy for certain conditions in Condorcet
elections. I've pointed out that no general strategy is known for Condorcet.

I've suggested concrete and practical strategies for real life elections
with Approval. I've told you where to find them. I won't repeat it for you
again. I refer you to my previous replies, and to my Approval article. The
one that I posted to EM fairly recently. The one that is at Democracy
Chronicles.





And in addition you say that any (your listed) strategy is ok. Why so? Is
there no good working strategy that all could use?

[endquote]

Yes there is. The better-than-expectation strategy. As I’ve said here many
times, all of the Approval expectation-maximizing strategies for Approval
are special cases of better-than-expectation.


I don't have a full description of that strategy yet.

[endquote]

I've repeated it for you many times, and told you where to find it. I've
helped you all I can. You're wasting my time.




The direct implementation of better-than-expectation could just consist of
approving the candidates who are better than (or maybe exactly as good as)
the result-merit that you expect from the election.

Juho says:

Is this the definition of the better-than-expectation strategy for regular
voters?

[endquote]

It's for any voter, regular or otherwise, who wants to vote strategically
in Approval.

Juho says:

Does "or maybe" mean random selection or selection based on what the voter
feels like that day?

[endquote]

I said "(or maybe exactly as good as)" because approving a candidate who is
exactly as good as your expectation doesn't affect your expectatation. It
doesn't matter whether or not you approve a candidate who is exactly as
good as your expectation. You can flip a coin, or yes, go by how you feel
that day.

Juho says:

Does "result-merit that you expect" mean the value of the (single) guessed
winner or maybe the weighted average of potential winners?

[endquote]

Answer to both questions: Yes, if that's what you feel that you know, or
have a perception or feel about.

People are not going to determine their expectation in the election by
multiplying the win probability of each candidate by hir utility, and
summing the products. But you can do that if you want to.


But you know how good a result you expect from the election.


Juho says:

Does the expectation refer to the sincere opinions or does it include the
expected strategic voting too (much more complicated and cyclic)?

[endquote]

...if you want it to.

Do as complicated and elaborate an analysis as you want to, to try to
calculate your expectation. It isn't for me to tell you if or how to
calculate your expectation, if you want to calculate it. That's your
business.

But, as I said above, you know how good a result you expect from the
election.

Or, if you really don't, then just use the 0-info Approval strategy of
approving the above-mean candidates.

Mike Ossipoff
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Clarification and correction about u/a strategy

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-17T23:50:17

Of course, if there are 2 sets of candidates such that the merit difference
within the two sets are negligible compared to the merit difference between
the sets, then it's clear that defeating the worse set is more important
than choosing among the better set.

 

So I mis-spoke when I said that, in ICT, if there's a C/D problem, you
should automatically vote E in 2nd place.  All of {A,B,C,D,E} belong in 1st
place.

 

It's just that, in the special situations where in Approval, you'd not
approve E, _that's_ when you'd move E down to 2nd place in ICT.

 

The various C/D solutions in Approval can,  in some circumstances, call for
not approving E. Those would also call for demoting E to 2nd place in ICT.

 

It's the same strategy response, in both methods, though it's different in
the 2 methods. Obviously, that response is considerably milder and less
costly in lCT. That's ICT's advantage over Approval.

 

Of course, in a u/a election, certain conditions would have to be met before
you'd let the C/D solutions make you (in Approval) not approve E, or (in
ICT) move E down to 2nd place.

 

For instance, maybe E is only barely or marginally acceptable. &/or maybe,
perhaps due to things said by E supporters and organization, there's doubt
about whether E really would implement hir good platform policies or
campaign promises. In a u/a election, to justify the non-approval or the 2nd
place demotion of E,  A,B,C, or D should have a (good?) chance of winning.

 

If E is clearly the big favorite among {A,B,C,D,E}, and the only one
winnable, then you don't want to do the non-approval or demotion. I'm
assuming that E is at least marginally acceptable in a u/a election.

 

Even if E supporters attack or continually bad-talk A,B,C and D, that isn't
a practical reason to not approve E or to demote E to 2nd, if E's platform
would bring some genuine improvement, and is on the acceptable side.

 

And if E's lesser improvements would result at least in a more open system,
with more open and honest media, better media and ballot access, etc., that
would be a start toward better improvement, no matter how much E's
supporters are criticizing A, B, C, and D.

 

Later, with E elected, if things aren't good, then of course E is unlikely
to get your full support next time, and the various C/D solutions would come
into play if E remains marginally acceptable. Or maybe E has by then become
unacceptable and wouldn't be considered for approval or top ranking.

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Concerns of KM & RF. Approval,Condorcet & ICT strategy. Reform schedule.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-17T06:09:19

Kristofer:

 

You expressed concern about uncertainty about how to vote in Approval. Let
me re-word what I was trying to say about that:

 

First, for simplicity let's say that you belong to a faction that all prefer
and vote as you do. What you object to is that, in Approval, you don't know
the way of voting by

which your faction can get the best result possible. But what you _do_ know
(if you like and choose strategic voting) is the way of voting that will
maximize your expectation, based on what your expectation already is. (I've
already said much about the better-than-expectation strategy of Approval)

 

That's good enough. You can't expect to know exactly what ballot marks will
give the best outcome for you.

 

I emphasize that, in Condorcet, you don't know either of those things, _even
if it's a u/a election_. Especially if it's a u/a election.

 

And do you really think that our elections don't have unacceptable
candidates who could win? .or two sets of candidates such that the merit
differences within

the sets are negligible compared to the merit difference between the sets?

 

In contrast, Approval's u/a strategy (as is its non-u/a strategy) is not
only known, but is the simplest there is: Approve (only) all the
acceptables.

 

Yes, Condorcet has the consolation or compensation that, if the election
isn't u/a, and if you don't much care about the results, then you can rank
the candidates at as many rank positions as you want to. But sincere ranking
would be a big mistake in a u/a election. And often in a non-u/a election
too, if the result matters. Condorcet's supposed strategy-free-ness is only
a sometimes, maybe, thing. And when it isn't that "sometime", then you
_really_ don't know what to do. Approval voting is incomparably easier and
simpler.

 

Richard expressed the concern that, if Approval were enacted, then maybe
people wouldn't be willing to later change to something else, and those who
would like to go to something better wouldn't have the opportunity. In other
words, if you don't enact Condorcet instead of Approval, before Approval,
then you'll never get an opportunity to enact Condorcet.

 

A valid concern. Valid to ask about, but not valid to be concerned about. 

 

Forgive me for repeating this: If Approval were enacted, there would be
changes in government and society, such that the media would be incomparably
more free and open. Campaign laws and ballot-access laws would be more fair.
Political debates would be more inclusive. These things would result from a
government that is more what the voters want. Also, for one thing, after the
results of the first Approval election, it would no longer be as easy to
exclude non-Republocrats from ballots, debates, editorial letters, articles,
news coverage, airtime, etc. 

 

And it would be well-established that voting system improvement is possible,
because it would be an observed fact. People would be open to it. People
would know the subject of voting systems better than they do now. 

 

The environment would be _much_ more favorable to rank-balloting than it now
is.

 

Now, make no mistake: Condorcet, or rank-methods in general won't be easy,
any time. But if they're ever do-able at all, then it will be when Approval
has started the improvement and shown that there is such a thing as good
voting system reform.   .and shown the numerical importance of
non-Republocrat candidates, voters and parties.

 

So no, getting a fancier method won't be harder after Approval. That's when
it will be possible, if it ever will.

 

Any improvement would be a step. That's the spirit of the Declaration.
That's why none of us should oppose eachother's proposals in any publication
or forum other than here at EM. Fighting eachother and opposing eachother's
proposals in public would be counterproductive, a ruinous hindrance to
reform.

 

Does it sound self-serving when I say that Approval should be the first
step, the first proposal? I've told many times why Approval is so much more
proposable,  acceptable, enactable. Approval is literally the minimal change
from Plurality that will get rid of Plurality's big fault. Approval is
nothing more than the repeal of Plurality's ridiculous rule, the rule that
makes Plurality a blatantly, bizarrely undemocratic points rating system.

 

The desirability of that change is so obvious, as is the fact that it's an
improvement and nothing other than an improvement, that Approval  might even
be enacted (Plurality's funny rule repealed) via a voting rights court
ruling. 

 

Even if you think that Condorcet is enactable, you must agree that
Approval's expected enactment time is much less than that of Condorcet. Do
you really think that there's a reason to do without reform for a longer
time?

 

You want something more than Approval. So do I. I've been saying that all
along. I want defection-resistance. It can be had in ICT, and probably in
Kristofer's CC/ABE method proposals (but of course they don't meet FBC, but
ICT does).

 

So, when Approval has made genuine open discussion possible, you can propose
Condorcet, and I'll propose ICT. You don't seem me proposing ICT now, do
you? It would be something to ask for later. Though I'd prefer ICT, I'm now
only suggesting to propose Approval, because that's what's do-able.

 

When someone said that  favorite-burial isn't a technically-valid strategy
in Condorcet, I replied that favorite-burial is indeed a technically optimal
strategy in Condorcet, if it's a u/a election, and if it seems like
Condorcet is the only acceptable who can beat the unacceptables. 

 

If you have no idea which acceptable can beat the unacceptables, then
top-rank them all. 

 

If it's somewhere in between, as will usually be the case, then you don't
know what to do. You don't know what ballot ranking would give your faction
its best result. You don't even know what ballot ranking would maximize your
expectation. No one knows, in Condorcet.

 

What about ICT? Completely different ballgame. There is no strategic need
for favorite-burial, in u/a or non-u/a. Therefore you won't be wondering
whether your best u/a strategy is Compromise alone at top, or all
acceptables at top.  Vote all of the acceptables at top. 

 

Ok, I admit that I don't know whether there's advantage, in a u/a election,
to rank the unacceptables with the more winnable ones nearest the bottom. I
would expect that your treatment of the unacceptables should be either that,
or not ranking them at all.  Are rank methods complicated contraptions or
what! But I still like ICT.

 

But, in any case, you won't have the lack of known strategy that you'd have
in Condorcet.

 

I've always said that you can't really discuss voting systems in a vacuum.
But I'll call the candidates in this example, A, B, C, D, E, and F.   But,
fill in, for yourself, _actual_ candidates for them to represent, so that
these situations aren't being discussed in a vacuum.

 

F is the unacceptable. There could be more, but it's simpler, and just as
good, to have just one.

 

A , B, C, D, and E are the acceptables. A is your favorite. But you like B,
C, D and E a lot too.

 

Oh, one other thing, you don't like E as much as B, C, and D.  E has some
very good policy proposals, but is also somewhat lacking. Just to give you
an example, E's platform says that we should adequately fund NPR (National
Public Radio) because of its excellent news and commentary  :-|   :-)

 

But I'm not naming any names.

 

So, it's u/a. How would you vote in Approval? Of course you'd approve A, B,
C, D, and E.

 

But maybe that could be complicated by a C/D problem. Maybe the E people
aren't as co-operative as you are, and maybe everything that they've said
indicates that they will not vote for anyone but E, because they want E to
win instead of A, B, C, or D.

 

I should look up and re-post my 5 suggestions for dealing with C/D in
Approval. It needn't be a problem. For now, I'll just say that some of those
5 solutions might call for not approving E, depending on the circumstances.

 

C/D is solvable in Approval, but it definitely involves strategy  (as it
would in Condorcet too).

 

What if the method is ICT? If there isn't any C/D problem, then I suggest
that the optimal u/a strategy is to vote as in Approval. As I said, that
makes ICT voting a lot simpler and easier than Condorcet voting. Just
top-rank A, B, C, D, and E. 

 

Since F is the only unacceptable, you're done with your ranking.

 

(If there's been more than one unacceptable, then maybe you should rank them
below top, in reverse order of their (guessed) ability to beat an
acceptable).

 

But what if there's a C/D situation? Rank E in second place, instead of at
top. Because of ICT's defection-resistance, it's pretty safe to do that.

 

But of course, in a u/a election, it's really bad strategy to not top-rate
all of the acceptables. And the strategy I've suggested here is to downrank
E. That constitutes a little bit of a C/D problem. I'll call it a u/a C/D
problem. It's much less than Approval's or Condorcet's C/D problem, because
it's unlikely that F will win because you ranked E in second place.

 

ICT's  u/a C/D problem is a minor one.

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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C/D resistant Condorcet methods.

Kristofer Munsterhjelm — 2012-05-14T22:13:01

Here's a Condorcet method that I think retains CT's defection resistance 
while being closer to cloneproof. It is Smith,DSC (but I think DAC would 
also work).

Consider Mike's usual C/D example:

Sincere rankings are

33: A>B
32: B>A
34: C

In DSC, {AB} is affirmed with a strength of 65. Then A wins because it's 
supported by one more voter than B. If the A-voters try to defect by 
voting only for A, that reduces the strength of {AB} to 32 so that C 
wins. Similarly, if the B-voters try to defect by voting only for B, 
that reduces the strength of {AB} to 33 so that C still wins.

If all the clones are in the Smith set, this Smith,D*C resists clones. 
However, it might be possible to set up an example where only some of 
the clones are in the Smith set. I'm not sure.

One could also make an ICT analog. Call the ICT version of the Smith 
set, ISmith. Then ISmith,DSC and ISmith,DAC could be constructed.

Also note that one pays a bit for the resistance in that the method no 
longer picks the optimal candidate when faced with sincere votes that 
happen to look like a partial defection. That is, if voters sincerely 
mean that:

33: A>B (33 prefer A to B and both to C)
32: B   (32 like B alone)
34: C   (34 like B alone)

then it won't elect B. That's unavoidable: the method can't read the 
voters' minds, so it can either elect B in the case above (which would 
mean it isn't resistant to C/D), or it can elect someone else (in which 
case, it is, but fails to pick the optimal "sincere" winner).

In picking A instead of C, it might even support the "count all 
candidates ranked above the winner as Approved" modification.

I suspect that Smith,IRV (and also Alternative Smith) resists C/D (but 
it's not monotone and has all the problems IRV has within the Smith set. 
I also have a vague suspicion that you can't have ISmith (ICT, ICA, etc) 
and clone independence, but I don't know that for sure.

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Ok, the subject here is a waste of time.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-13T20:30:26

 

In my most recent 2 postings, I've tried to somehow get through to EM
members regarding the matter of feasible significant improvement. 

 

We really have been talking about entirely different subjects.

 

Sure, it was obvious from past experience that that effort was almost surely
a waste of time, but I felt that I should make one more effort in that
direction. That

additional effort to get through consisted of my two previous postings. All
that's to say on the subject has been said now.

 

I said that I reply to all, but there would have to be a clear and specific
statement or question that calls for an answer. I didn't find that in Paul's
or Robert's posting. 

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

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To Condorcetists:

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-13T01:04:31

Condorcetists:

You want to quibble forever about which rank-count is the best.

You object that Approval doesn't let you help your 1st and 2nd choices
against your last choice, while still helping your
1st choice against your 2nd choice.

But the _big_ benefit starts when everyone can support their 1st and 2nd
choices at all.

Plurality very effectively puts a gag on everyone who would like something
better than the corrupt sleazes
that your tv offers as "the two choices".

"We have to hold our nose and vote for the lesser-evil [Democrat], so that
we don't waste our vote."

Do you have any idea how things would be if everyone could actually support
their favorites, and without
having to try to guess on which one the other similar voters would be
combining their support?

Do you understand the difference between "liked" and "unliked"? And what
would happen if everyone could support
whom and what they actually like best?

Do you have any idea how far-reaching the resulting changes would be?

No, I'm not saying that the resulting country and world would be perfect in
every way. I'm saying that it
would be what people actually want--something that they can support without
holding their nose. But don't
underestimate  the magnitude of that change.

Though I consider Approval to be the best in some meaningful ways, I also
would like more--as you would.

But, as I said, most of the benefit comes from everyone being able to
support 1st choice and 2nd choice _at all_. Let's not
be greedy and dwaddle around forever about what else we could ideally get.

Do you want improvement or not? Or would you rather debate forever?

And, as for helping 1st choice over 2nd choice, while helping both over
last choice, free of strategy need:

You're in deinal about Gibbard-Satterthwaite.

You're in denial about Condorcet's blatant and full-magnitude
co-operation/defection problem.

And you're in denial about millions of voters' need to litterally maximally
help the Democrat beat the Republican.

And that's not even counting the good chance of successful offensive burial
strategy when there are more than 3 candidates.

Mike Ossipoff
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Completely different reasons for and purposes of methodadvocacy.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-11T21:56:39

Condordet's method (including Kemeny) is of some non-practical mathematical
interest, as a possible answerto the question
"How should we count sincere rankings?"

I have no criticism of that abstract and non-practical study.

In the real world, however,  we can't assume sincere rankings. Strategy
must be considered. Methods' strategy problems must
be considered.

This makes the real world, public political elections, voting system choice
an entirely different problem, as opposed to the academic
debate over the best way to count sincere rankings.

I've argued that FBC failure is the seriously societally-damaging
criterion-failure, and I've told my justifications for that claim.

Additionally, I've mentioned the co-operation/defection problem, or
chicken-dilemma, which makes nonsens of any claim
that Condorcet gets rid of strategy need in the real world.

So, I suggest that it's important that we keep it straight which discussion
we're participating in: The academic question of how best
to count sincere rankings, or the real world question of what will avoid
societal harm when used in public political elections.

We have different reasons for our participation here.

Speaking for myself, I suggest that _results_ are what is important.
Societal results.

Some others are saying, "My method is the ideal best!" Well, for one thing,
remember what Richard said about that claim: What is the ideal
best must depend on which criterion or criteria you consider the most
important.

Besides, of what relevance is the ideal best, if it doesn't get enacted?
And no, it isn't enough to say, "Yes, but if my method _were_ enacted..."

"If"s are irrelevant. As I've recently quoted, "If wishes were horses...".

Are we interested in actual social improvements that actually happen, or
are we interested in ideal best, when we don't even agree on by
what criteria to judge ideal best-ness?

Shall we keep on fighting about who goes through the door, like the 3
Stooges, or shall we actually get through the door?

Mike Ossipoff
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u/a for criteria. u/a FBC. Voter's Choice. SSCS. Strong FBC.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-11T21:31:12

Of course the way to define u/a for criteria would be in terms of votes.

A definition of u/a for criteria:

In a critrerion failure-example, an election is u/a for some particular
voter V iff:

The candidates can be divided into two sets, A and B, such that V votes all
of the candidates in A over all of the candidates in B, and doesn't vote a
preference
within A or B unless the failure-example critrerion-writer can prove
conclusively that it isn't possible to contive a configuration of ballots
other than that of V, such that:

.....V, by voting that particular preference within A or B, causes the
winner to come from set B, where the winner would have come from set A if V
hadn't voted
.....that paraticular preference within A or B.

[end of definition of u/a for criteria]

An election is All-u/a if it is u/a for every voter in that election.

[end of All-u/a definition]

A tentative definition of u/a FBC:

In an All-u/a election, FBC should never be violated.

[end of tentative definition of u/a FBC]

To questions suggest themselves:

1. Does compiance with u/a FBC guarantee that there won't be a
societally-damaging favorite-burial incentive?

2. Do Smith-Approval and Smith-Top meet u/a FBC?


Voter's Choice:

I'm going to refine my definition of Voter's Choice, but first let me
summarize what I've already said:

The Voter's Choice definition that has a voter's ballot giving a point to
the winner by that voter's designated method, and also to every
candidate ranked higher on hir ballot, has two problems:

1. It spoils the defection resistance of ICT and Smith-Top.

2. It legislates Approval to a degree that could be considered unfair by
non-Approvalists.

So I prefer the definition that merely says:

Voters may designate a method. The methods are weighted according to how
many people have designated them.

In other words, each candidate receives a point for each voter who has
designated a method that elects that candidates.

[end of previous Voter's Choice definition]

It occurred to me that if there are two good methods that you feel will
give a good result, and you like one more than the other, but that other
is likely to have more support from others, then there could be the
familiar split-vote problem, for deciding which method to designnate.

So then, why not let voters designate more than one method?:

I'll now call this Voter's Choice 2:

A voter may designate one or more methods.

The methods are weighted according to the number of people who have
designated them.

In other words, each candidate receives a point for each voter who has
designated one or more of the methods that have chosen hir.
The candidate with the most points wins.

[end of Voter's Choice 2 definition]

I think that Voter's Choice 2 is considerably better than Voter's Choice.
I'll probably soon say that Voter's Choice 2 is what I ;mean
by "Voter's Choice". But, since Voter's Choice 2 is a new proposal, then,
for now, I'll leave them with those two different names.

For EM polls, or even for public elections,  whenever it's desired to make
a choice when there is no one established method,
then Voter's choice 2, or maybe Voter's Choice, would be the best way to
make that choice.

SSCS:

I now claim that SSCS says something that _is_ of interest. It speaks of
whether or not, when making Compromise win instead of Worse
is the only way to defeat Worse, and when there is a way that you can vote
that will achieve that, you have a specific simple way of voting
that will achieve that.

Approval and Abucklin (in all of its versions) are the only methods that
have even been claimed to meet SSCS.

Also, no one has suggested that any method other than Approval can meet
Strong FBC.

By the way, speaking of Approval and criteria, it's been some time since I
looked at Arrow's criteria, but it seems to me that the only
one of those that Approval fails is a _rules_ criterion, as opposed to a
_results_ criterion. It's a "criterion" that requires that the method be
a rank method.

I have no use for rules "criteria".

I could be mistaken, because I haven't looked at Arrow's criteria for a
long time.

Mike Ossipoff




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New popularization article

Rémi — 2012-05-11T14:49:02

Dear all,

I inform you that my second popularization article (in French) on the mathematics of democracy has just been published online (free access) :
http://images.math.cnrs.fr/Et-le-vainqueur-du-second-tour-est.html .

Hoping that it will contribute to make people know better the research on electoral methods,

Kind regards,
Rémi Peyre

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Comments on a few things said by Richard & Robert, May 10, '12

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-10T19:43:14

Richard said that my reply to his "rebuttal" wasn't credible because I
only repeated
from my article. For one thing, that isn't correct. Though in one part
of my counter-rebuttal,
I spoke of optimizations resulting from the strategies listed in my
article, I also questioned other
things that Richard had said, without repeating from my article.

Additionally, though my article listed some Approval strategies, it
_didn't_ list all of the optimizations
that I mentioned in my counter-rebuttal. So my mention of those
optimizations were not repetition from the article.

Anyway, as I've already said, when Richard claimed that Approval would
have results that would make people want
to go back to Plurality, it was called-for for me to say something
about Approval's results. That justified my
mention of those optimizations.

Richard has never supported his claims regarding Approval or my article.

As I said, vagueness, sloppiness, unaccountability and failure to
support his statements are his standard tactic.

Now, to comment on some things said by Robert. I like to be able to
say that, unlike some people, I answer all questions.
I don't want to be accused of evasion.

I'll reply to Dave Ketchum's post too. Now for Robert's post:

Robert said:

the reason that it is silly and undemocratic to elect someone who is not
the Condocet Winner is simple: if you do that, you have elected to
office a candidate when *more* of us voters marked explicitly on our
ballots that we wanted someone else.  if more of us voters agree that
Candidate A is a better choice for office than those of us who agree
that Candidate B is better, then what sense of democracy is upheld by
electing Candidate B?


[endquote]

In other words, Condorcet's Criterion is justified because failing to
comply with it would
violate Condorcet's Criterion.

Every criterion tells about some desideratum. Because the different
desiderata conflict with eachother, are
often mutually incompatible, not available with the same methods, then
we must choose which desiderata are
important to us.

I've amply spoken of the societal damage resulting from FBC failure.

Robert continues:


that's why i hold the Condorcet criterion higher than FBC

[endquote]

As I've said in a previous post, when FBC sufficiently makes is
problem, when it causes a significant
number of voters to bury their favorite, then Condorcet's Criterion
compliance becomes entirely meaningless
and valueless.

The relevance and meaning of Condorcet's Criterion depends on an
absence of the choice-distortions caused
by FBC failure.

So FBC clearly dominates and trumps Condorcet's Criterion.

As the introducer and initial proponent of Condorcet(wv), the now
predominant Condorcet family of methods, I'll
agree that Condorcet is very appealing to beginners.

But subsequent experience has shown me that it isn't good enough.

Maybe I know how Dr. Frankenstein must have felt :-)

...with Condorcet(wv) out there devastating the
voting-system-reform-advocacy countryside.

Robert continues:

do you propose to post these suggested instruction for voters at the
polls?

[endquote]

I hadn't suggested that. But it wouldn't oppose the posting of some of
my simpler
suggetions:

"Approve whomever you like and trust, or consider deserving of your support."

OR

Approve whom you'd vote for in Plurality, and everyone who is better
than him/her."

Note, Robert, that I made it clear that people needn't do other than
approving those whom
they like and trust.

Note that I said that, if _they want_ strategy, then the simple
strategy of approving whom they'd
vote for in Plurality, plus everyone better, would be sufficient.

Note that I clarified that the additional strategies that I
subsequently listed _don't_ make
Approval more complicated than Plurality. The only reason why you
don't hear such strategy suggestions
for Plurality is because no one knows them. Or, even if they were
known, they'd be too complicated to
suggest you to use.


Robert continued:

do you expect that any decent proportion of voters would go into
the booth, pull the curtain, and strategize thusly?

[endquote]

Few would, I would expect. Most would just approve those candidates whom they
like and trust, or consider deserving of their support.

But yes, some might approve the candidate they'd vote for in
Plurality, and everyone who is better.



Robert said:

perhaps these are perfectly good tactics to take into the booth in an
Approval election, but it's unreasonable to expect voters that are any
less savvy than the most sophisticated to know about, think about, and
take these tactics into the voting booth.

[endquote]

Robert, re-read what I said above, and in the strategy section of my article.


Robert continued:

*and*, as a matter of general
principle, we want to *remove* any burden of tactical voting from the
general electorate.  we want them to not have to worry about their
contingency vote acting to harm their favorite.

[endquote]

And your myth is that Condorcet can't require such strategy. I refer
you to my posts
about Condorcet's co-operation/defection problem, and its
favorite-burial incentive problem.

Mike Ossipoff
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Smith-Top

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-10T18:55:16

I emphasize that I don't know if u/a FBC makes a satisfactory guarantee.

With it, FBC must be complied with only if the election is u/a to everyone.
So, someone wanting to
write a failure-example would have to devise an example in which, for
everyone, there are 2 sets of candidates such that hir preferences within
the sets are negligibly weak in comparison to hir preference between the
sets. And there must not be anything that positively rules out a win in the
less-preferred set.

I don't know if satisfying that criterion would guarantee that there
couldn't be societally-damaging favorite-burial incentive.

I don't know for sure if I could write a really precisely-worded u/a FBC,
because I haven't previously written criteria that refer to
preference-strength, or in which the
premise contains a stipulation that a win in a certain set not be
positively ruled out.

And I don't know if Smith-Top would pass that criterion.

But, as I said, the matter is of interest, because I consider FBC to be
important, because of the societal consequences of failing it. If a weaker
FBC
such as u/a FBC could be sufficient, then more methods would be acceptable.

Anyway, Smith-Top means what you'd expect it to mean: Elect the Smith set
member who is ranked in 1st place on the most ballots.

Smith-Top obviously meets Condorcet's Criterion.

Smith-Top would be a method in the spirit of Kristofer's Smith-Approval,
but attempting to copy ICT's defection-resistance.

Smith-Top is to Smith-Approval as ICT is to ICA.

I'm not proposing Smith-Top, for the reasons given above.

Kristofer: Let me know if you intended u/a FBC different from how I've
described it.

Mike Ossipoff
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CC, Co-operation/Defection,definitions of Approval and VoteFair

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-08T21:59:50

First, a co-operation/defection problem example at the opposite extreme:

Sincere preferences:

33: A>B
32: B>A
34: C

Now, replying to Richard:

Richard says:

Instead of publishing my "rebuttal" as an article, here is what I
suggest.  Adrian, in his own words, can introduce Mike's article by
saying that the article is about one of many voting methods

[endquote]

At no time did I say that Approval was the only votinlg method.




Richard continues:

  and about one of many characteristics of voting methods (FBC).

[endquote]

My article mentioned that Approval doesn't give favorite-burial incentive,
and
tells why that's important, but the revised version, the one that was
published,
makes no mention of the name "FBC".

Richard thinks that I should explain that there are other properties by
which to evaluate
and compare methods, but I didn't say or imply that there weren't.

I recommend that anyone should feel free, when proposing
or describing a method, to tell what desirable properties it has.  ...as
did I.

Richard continues:

Ideally I would hope that Mike recognizes that his article fails to
describe Approval voting in a way that would be understood by most
readers of Democracy Chronicles

[endquote]

Well, let's see...I suggested that the voter be allowed to give to each
candidate a rating of "Approved" or "Unapproved",
and that the candidate with the most "Approved" ratings wins.

Which part of that does Richard have trouble with?




Richard continues:

And I think that using an example
of people raising hands or saying "yes" makes it easy to understand, and
encourages people to try using it.

[endquote]

I like the illustrtion of an Approval ballot, which Adrian included. That
showing of an Approval
ballot helps to clarify what Approval voting is like.

Richard continues:

I would think that Mike would want
people to try it to see how simple it is, and to give people an
opportunity to experience how it works better than plurality voting.

[endquote]

Of course. But I don't know if Democracy Chronicles is set up for that sort
of interactive balloting.

By the way, I did propose a poll at EM a few months ago, for that very
purpose (not just for Approval,
but for rank-balloting too).

At EM, we've done a number of presidential polls, and at least two polls
regarding voting systems. Most of them
were proposed by me.

Now that we're on the subject of polls: Richard keeps saying that, these
days, he hears more in favor of CC than FBC.
...and he probably hears more advocacy of Condorcet (versions not usually
specified) than of Approval.

EM's constantly shifting participating-memberts mix will sometimes favor
Condorcet, and sometimes Approval.

Richard suggested a poll. As I've said, we had at least two polls on voting
systems. Two that I know of. Maybe they were the
only ones.

In the first such poll, the winner was Smith//Condorcet, the best Condorcet
version we knew of at the time. In 2nd place was
Plain Condorcet, now more often referred to as "MinMax(wv). They won by
every method we counted.

That poll held fairly soon after I introduced the Condorcet(wv) family of
voting systems. Condorcet(wv) has become the
predominant and popular class or family of Condorcet versions, and
inludes Markus Schultz's now popular CSSD/Beatpath version of
Condorcet(wv).

In our other voting systems poll, Approval won, by every method we counted.

So, you see, a voting systems poll is just a snapshot of one momentary
configuration of EM's constantly shifting active-poster
mix.

In all of our polls, presidential and on voting systems, Approval always
chose the CW. Warren Smith has spoken of why that
tends to be so.

By the way, Richard, when you keep referring to the Condorcet's Criterion
advocates heard from so much these days, would
you, by any chance, be referring to Dave Ketchum and Robert Bristow?

Forest Simpson isn't participating these days, but he was for a long time,
and he is an Approvalist, though he discusses many
interesting ideas about other methods too. Forest also likes MCA and MTA.
He was the introducer of MCA, which led to MTA.
Approval, MCA, and MTA meet FBC, but not Condorcet's Criterion.

As recently as a few months ago there was an another Approvalist active on
EM, but
who is no longer participating. As I said--snapshots of a constantly
shifting membership.

Look at the credentialled signers list, of the Declaration. You'll find
Approval well-represented.

By the way, Richard, though your VoteFair is defined at your website, is
there some reason why you don't want to post
its definition to EM?

Richard says:

There is no need to mention the Condorcet criteria [criterion] , as long as
Mike does
not make any false claims about it

[endquote]

Richard is invited to specify a false claim that I've made about
Condorcdt's Criterion.


Richard says:

, which I think that Adrian can now
identify as opinions rather than mathematically supported facts.

[endquote]

Richard is invited to _specifically_ name a mathematically incorrect
statement that
I've made about Condorcet's Criterion.

...or a statement or opinion that I've made, which needs mathematical
support
that I've failed to provide upon request. (For one thing, I haven't heard
any requests prior to this
message).

But it's pointless to ask Richard to specify what he means. Vagueness is
his standard technique.


Mike Ossipoff
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"FBC vs Condorcet's Criterion"

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-08T18:46:35

Since Richard wants to make a "which one wins" comparison between FBC and
Condorcet's Criterion (CC), then I'll
remind him that, when FBC failure sufficiently makes its problem, CC
compiance becomes quite meaningless and valueless.

And there is good reason to believe, as described in my previous post, that
Condorcet's FBC failure _will_ fully make its problem
in our public elections.

Mike Ossipoff
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[Urgent] Information about M. Schulze

Rémi — 2012-05-08T17:03:05

Dear all,

A few days ago, I sent an e-mail personally to Markus Schulze to ask him some information about himself, as the popularization article I am currently writing deals with his eponymous method and it would be far better if I could link the concepts explained to alive, real people. But Markus did not answer to me, probably because he does not check his e-mail box very often, or because my e-mail was taken for spam. As I am very late (the article is to appear on next Friday!), I do not have the time to wait any more for Makus' answer, so I write to all of you to ask for the desired information.

Below are the questions I asked to Markus [*]. If one of you does know one or several answers, please send them to me.

«
- Which country are you from?
- When were you born? (and thus how old were you when you devised your method)
- What are you doing for a job now?
- And what were you doing for a job when you devised your method?
- Could you say a few words on the context in which you proposed your new idea: what was your goal, why were you interested in questions about the mathematics of democracy, what was the heuristics you followed, etc.?
- Could you send me a photograph of you? (either contemporary, or from the time you devised your method: bouth would be fine).
»

[*] Concerning the photograph, you may send one to me if you do have one, but I could not use it without Markus' authorization (anyhow, it could save some time if Markus aswered at the very last minute).

Thanks in advance!

Kind regards,
Rémi Peyre

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