gmane.science.physics.fabric-of-reality

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Elliot Temple — 2012-05-26T04:10:31

On May 25, 2012, at 4:55 PM, brian_scurfield wrote:


A good place to start would be a bunch of non-programming examples and implications.

Here is part of one, with some questions:

We know in general terms that most school-learned knowledge is very *fragile*. That word fragile refers to its *structure*. It means that people have trouble modifying it and adapted it to different situations. It has a bad structure and is hard to use except in just the right context for it. It's not very resilient to different contexts or changes.

If you don't know what I mean, look up Feynman's attempts to teach physics in Brazil. His students have very fragile knowledge and memorize a lot of stuff exactly rather than learning more general concepts.

So I've described something in abstract terms but there's all sorts of more concrete issues here: how can we actually describe the structure of this knowledge directly? Could we write down the ideas and diagram them and show how it's fragile and what would be a better organizat

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Brett Hall — 2012-05-26T00:49:58

On 25/05/2012, at 5:17 PM, "Elliot Temple" <curi-h468vE2XxCs< at >public.gmane.org> wrote:

Is it really a mistake for me to do this?

Just change the subject to anything else at all and see how *your* response reads...

"that is an implication of your view of gravity. But to assume your view of gravity is true, in a reply to someone saying your conception of gravity may be false, is a mistake."

If someone rejects the very entity that seems self evident to others, what else can you do? If someone says "well curvature of space might be how *you* choose to think about gravity...but I reject that. I think it's false. I don't think gravity exists at all. Curvature of space is an illusion. When we drop things and they fall to the earth, we're actually mistaken about that very observation. At least it *might* turn out we are mistaken..." and so on.

Brett


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Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

brian_scurfield — 2012-05-25T23:55:49


On May 25, 2012, at 12:25 AM, Elliot Temple wrote:

The same knowledge can be structured in many different ways and the structure affects our ability to use and to modify the knowledge. Knowing good ways to structure knowledge is therefore important. Once again, philosophy is called for, but the field of structural epistemology is relatively undeveloped. So, what are some important problems in structural epistemology?

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Bruno Marchal — 2012-05-25T09:37:16


If the idea "I am conscious" is false, and asserted by the machine, it  
is not a first person idea.  But consciousness is a first person  
notion, so here such machine does not acquire the idea that he is  
conscious. It might utter "I am conscious", but without giving any  
meaning to the sentence. The first person idea of consciousness cannot  
be said, in that case, to have been acquired.

Conscious people, on the contrary, are incorrigible on consciousness  
(like on knowledge if you accept the standard definition of knowledge,  
where only a truth can be known).





We might believe that, but it is not knowledge (with the standard  
sense). It is conjectural 'knowledge'. (= belief, in the standard  
sense).




For creating belief. For knowledge, my feeling is that true  
referential (or self-referential) beliefs might be responsible for  
(self) consciousness.




My current feeling on this, is that all universal number are  
conscious. It is the starting initial point of the differentiating  
cons

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

2012-05-25T15:45:15

Citeren Henry Sturman <henry-wQxkM/xpHhjR7s880joybQ< at >public.gmane.org>:


That's a bit of a straw man argument, as you have put additional 
baggage in the person who knows that he doesn't understand Chinese. If 
you ignore this baggage and let the person reply in Chinese using the 
lookup table method, then when asked in Cinese if he understands 
Chinese, he'll answer that he does understand Chinese.

Of course, he really does not undersand any Chinese, but clearly the 
whole process in which the person only plays a trivial role, does 
understand Chinese.


When we say that a model is not the real thing, we have to consider if 
that distinction is relevant for AI or consciousness. I don't think it 
is, because the brain itself is known to use models of reality and that 
we experience that simulated relality and not the real thing. This is 
how Uri Geller can make you see him bending spoons  by mere touch. What 
you experience here is due to the brain inventing missing information 
based on what information it

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Brian Scurfield — 2012-05-25T07:46:47


On 25 May 2012, at 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



I don't see why an unconscious knowledge-generating computer program could not acquire a false idea that is it conscious. Like any knowledge creator, it would be fallible. What you have not explained is the relationship between creating knowledge and consciousness. We know that there are knowledge-creating processes that are not conscious -- for example, biological evolution -- so consciousness is not a necessity for creating knowledge. So, what is it about human knowledge creation processes that requires consciousness? I'm not saying there couldn't be a relationship, but at this point in time we don't know enough.
 
 
What problems does it solve saying that the subconscious mind has its own consciousness?


If it were a clear concept, you should be able to explain it to others.


You just said before that we cannot define it. What problem are you trying to solve in defining it like that?


But then one could do the same computations and create the same

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Elliot Temple — 2012-05-24T23:25:58

On May 24, 2012, at 11:22 AM, Henry Sturman wrote:


This is the wrong way to look at computer programs.

Programs with the same outputs for the same input are **not the same program**.

For example they may have different run times, be differently hard to re-use components of in other programs, be differently hard to add features too, and many other differences. They may be arriving at these same outputs by different internal algorithms (e.g. recursion vs iteration).

Re: The (scientific) observer is now a scientific target (for 20 years). Sorry!

Elliot Temple — 2012-05-24T23:21:38

On May 23, 2012, at 6:00 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:


What's so difficult to believe about thousands of non-philosophers going down a metaphorical dead end road together, which is a dead end due to reasons they've never studied?

History is full of examples of more people being even more wrong together, including examples where those people were generally acknowledged as top experts who had dedicated a lot of their life to their work and were wrong in their field anyway.

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Elliot Temple — 2012-05-24T23:17:13

On May 23, 2012, at 6:34 PM, Brett Hall wrote:


That is an implication of *your view of consciousness*. But to assume your view of consciousness is *true*, in a reply to someone saying your conception of consciousness may be false, is a mistake.

a nice illustration of what chapter 2 of the beginning of infinity talks about

Henry Sturman — 2012-05-24T18:11:24

http://www.htwins.net/scale2/

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Bruno Marchal — 2012-05-24T13:08:43

On 24 May 2012, at 10:53, Brian Scurfield wrote:

I agree with Brett. Consciousness cannot be a false idea (of the  
conscious person) in the sense that if you are conscious you cannot be  
deluded on this, because to be deluded, you need to be conscious.

Also, the subconscious mind can be conscious, without us being aware  
of it.

"having an idea" is not a very clear expression. It can meant many  
things, involving or not consciousness.




I don't understand this. Each of us know very clearly what it is,  
despite we cannot define it. It is like truth, or time. I don't think  
it is vague. Mysterious perhaps, and undecidable when it concerns  
others, but it is not vague at all. I would say it is clearer than  
anything we might be conscious of.




If you agree to define (approximatively) consciousness by' belief in a  
reality', then you can relate it to betting on our self-consistency,  
(by the completeness theorem) and this makes consciousness speeding up  
our computational ability. That suggests

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Henry Sturman — 2012-05-24T18:22:30

 calls it a duplication)
 n the computer on.
if you look only at information output, and information output happens 
to be all we want from a computer, then there is no difference
and similarly there is no difference in *behaviour* between a real 
chinese person, or a person who does not know chinese but sits in a 
chinese room manipulating symbols in order to simulate a chinese person
but the internal feeling of consciousness is different, as the real 
chinese person really *understands* chinese, while the non-chinese 
speaking person in the chinese room does *not* understand chinese and 
will tell you so if you ask him
and so too, the *information output* of a pizza oven might be the same 
as the *information output* of a simulation of a pizza oven
but the real oven can bake a *real pizza* while the pizza simulation 
machine *can not*
again, see the article 
http://machineslikeus.com/interviews/machines-us-interviews-john-searle-0

Re: The (scientific) observer is now a scientific target (for 20 years). Sorry!

Alan Forrester — 2012-05-24T08:19:21

On 24 May 2012, at 02:00, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:


Popperian epistemology and the Turing principle aren't based on assumptions, nor are they purported to be based on anything. Rather, both ideas are explicitly acknowledged as conjectures.


They have not had any success because their ideas about what to look for and how to look for it are crippled by ideas like inductivism. That is, they take for granted that people learn by induction, which is false. They also go looking for stuff without having much idea of what to look for or why.


Could you explain this assertion?


It's possible to observe stuff without doing science: that's what people did for most of human history.


They have no explanation of what the neurons are doing that would lead to thoughts or feelings or whatever.


Part of the problem is that nobody has clearly identified what they want to explain, and they are using junky epistemology, so their failure is not a surprise. If they don't know what algorithm they want to run, they can't

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Brian Scurfield — 2012-05-24T08:53:15

On 24 May 2012, at 13:34, Brett Hall <brhalluk-PkbjNfxxIARBDgjK7y7TUQ< at >public.gmane.org> wrote:


No, our subconscious mind has ideas.


Consciousness is a vague concept and right now, as far as I'm aware, nobody knows the relationship between knowledge creation and consciousness. What problems in our understanding of knowledge creation does consciousness solve? I don't know. Do you?

Re: Turing/AI issues

David Deutsch — 2012-05-24T09:20:03


It's false. For instance, one program might be exponentially less efficient than the other. That is a meaningful characteristic.

That's why the principle does not refer to 'meaningful characteristics', but only to 'computations' or 'information processing'.

Turing/AI issues

hibbsa — 2012-05-24T08:11:32

There are two issues facing both A.I. and the Turing Principle:

Firstly...forget consciousness for a moment and rewrite his principle
more simply "if a computer program accurately emulates another computer
program then any meaningful characteristic that program has, the
emulation also has".

No particular problem with that.

But now substitue "a cup of coffee" for the other program. If a computer
program accurately emulates a cup of coffee...does it become a cup of
coffee?

The answer could be yes or no. It could be yes,but with different
hardware and much more complex software. Or it could be no because
Turing's principle is only computational not physical.

Turning back to consciousness, what this shows is that embedded into the
Turing Principle is the assumption that consciousness is analogous to a
computer program, and not at all physical/structural like a cup of
coffee. That may be true...but it's a big assumption, and for that
reason, all this talk about "if the Turing Principle is wrong universal
com

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Brian Scurfield — 2012-05-24T07:53:49

On 24 May 2012, at 02:15, Henry Sturman <henry-wQxkM/xpHhjR7s880joybQ< at >public.gmane.org> wrote:


So, what is the difference between a virtual Windows PC instantiated on an iMac and an actual Windows PC?

RE: The (scientific) observer is now a scientific target (for 20 years). Sorry!

Colin Geoffrey Hales — 2012-05-24T01:00:50

-----Original Message-----
From: Fabric-of-Reality-hHKSG33TihhbjbujkaE4pw< at >public.gmane.org [mailto:Fabric-of-Reality-hHKSG33TihhbjbujkaE4pw< at >public.gmane.org] On Behalf Of Alan Forrester
Sent: Thursday, 24 May 2012 8:21 AM
To: Fabric-of-Reality-hHKSG33TihhbjbujkaE4pw< at >public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

On 23 May 2012, at 06:10, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

http://theconversation.edu.au/learning-experience-lets-take-consciousness-in-from-the-cold-6739

Hi all,

The points raised are not relevant anymore because they were all set up nearly a century ago, with the standard 300 year old presuppositions all through (In particular the assumed observer), in an era where the word 'neuroscience' was barely coined. 

The fact is that there are _thousands_ of scientists chasing 'Neural Correlates of P-consciousness'. All of them think they are doing science on a valid target = P-consciousness, no matter what anyone else thinks. Either they are all deluded or the class

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Brett Hall — 2012-05-24T01:34:08




On 24/05/2012, at 7:42 AM, "brian_scurfield" <briankscurfield-/E1597aS9LT10XsdtD+oqA< at >public.gmane.org> wrote:


It seems to me that this is a strict contradiction. Anything able to have a "false idea" is necessarily conscious. To have an idea at all is to presuppose consciousness.


As above. Once we can describe what it's like for a computer to have an idea...we will know it is conscious.

Brett


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Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

Alan Forrester — 2012-05-23T22:20:38


Other people have pointed out that you have not explained how you plan to solve the problem that your theory apparently clashes with the Turing principle, but there is another problem.

Your article is epistemologically bad (epistemology is the theory of the growth of knowledge). Saying that science has neglected the observer makes it sound like the most important feature of human beings is that we observe the world. But observation is a relatively small part of our knowledge and of how we make progress. Observation is an example of our general ability to create explanatory knowledge. Knowledge can't be created by observation because observations don't imply explanations or expectations of any kind, which invoke unseen events to explain or predict the things we see. Rather, explanations and expectations lead us to try to make some observations and not others. Arguments like this paragraph in your article:

http://theconversation.edu.au/learning-experience-lets-take-consciousness-in-from-the-cold-6739


con

Re: Joining post: 20 Years of a Science of Consciousness

brian_scurfield — 2012-05-23T21:29:42

--- In Fabric-of-Reality-hHKSG33TihhbjbujkaE4pw< at >public.gmane.org, Elliot Temple <curi< at >...> wrote:

One cannot formulate a clear concept without formulating an understanding of the problems to be solved. The question is designed to make the point that the problems are philosophical.

Now it may turn out that consciousness is a false idea we have, in which case one could not have a computer program that emulates a conscious process. The only thing that would be possible is for a computer program to acquire an equivalent false idea that it is conscious. However, the problem of why brains and computer programs acquire the false idea would still be a matter of philosophy and not a matter one could understand by studying the hardware.