gmane.politics.election-methods

Re: Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-26T07:25:27

Juho:

You said:

I'll add one additional question right away in order not to delay the
discussion by one more round.

On 25.5.2012, at 0.17, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

Juho says:
 
I assume that the strategy applies at least to all typical winning votes
based Condorcet methods.
 
Am I on the correct track so far?
 
[endauote]
 
Yes, Id say that, under the conditions I described, favorite-burial is
optimal in all Condorcet(wv) versions. But the sometime optimality of
favorite-burial is, by definition, a property of all FBC-failing methods.
Im not trying to single-out Condorcet(wv). Its just one of many
FBC-failing methods.

You said:

The definition of term "Condorcet(wv)" is not fully straight forward. 

[endquote]

Yes. It covers a broad set of methods that are loosely united as Condorcet
methods. I don't claim to give a precise definition of that term.

At least one of Condorcet's suggestions involved solving circular ties by
comparing defeat-strength. Every method called a Condorcet version must

Re: SODA terminology: opinions wanted.

Andy Jennings — 2012-05-25T20:34:22



How about: "Candidate A is first in the sharing order, so she shares her
delegated votes with candidates B and C." ?

I know we had a discussion in August where we decided to change "share" to
"add approvals to your vote" on the wiki, and I agreed that I liked it
better.  Maybe I'm reconsidering...

I like the word "share" because A passing on votes doesn't diminish her
own.  (Similar to filesharing.)

~ Andy
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SODA terminology: opinions wanted.

Jameson Quinn — 2012-05-25T14:06:37

I keep coming back to the basic question of terminology in SODA. If the
voters delegate their votes, what is the verb for the thing the candidates
do with those delegated votes? I want to be able to say: "Candidate A is
first in the XXXXXing order, so she XXXXXs YYYY for candidates B and C."
YYYY is probably "delegated approvals"; what is XXXX?

Assign? Cast? Commit? Fill in? Inject? Or is one word not enough, and you
need a phrase like "delegated adding order"?

I'd love it if someone could help me find a better option. Even if not, I
need more opinions before I can confidently choose one of the above options.

Jameson
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Re: Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

Juho Laatu — 2012-05-25T08:39:13

I'll add one additional question right away in order not to delay the discussion by one more round.

On 25.5.2012, at 0.17, Michael Ossipoff wrote:


The definition of term "Condorcet(wv)" is not fully straight forward. I assume that the definition covers at least the case where we have a top loop of three candidates, and one of those looped candidates has the smallest worst loss of all candidates when measured as winning votes, and that candidate shall win. Is the strategy valid in this special case only or maybe in all situations in all methods that meet the definition of Condorcet(wv) that I gave above?

Juho





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Re: Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

Juho Laatu — 2012-05-25T07:22:18


Based on what you say "u/a election" could be redefined => "if, for you, the POSSIBLY-WINNABLE candidates can be divided into two (NON-EMPTY) sets such that the merit differences within each set are negligible in comparison to the merit difference between the sets".

In my comment I however referred to the definition "If it’s a u/a election, and if Compromise is the only acceptable who can beat the unacceptables, then rank Compromise alone in 1st place". Words "the only acceptable" refer to exactly one possibly-winnable acceptable candidate. Later on in your mail you said that this limitation is not necessary, so let's assume also that limitation it's gone now.


Ok. I picked the sincere rankings from the air as a default answer since their treatment was not defined. If the voter rearranges those candidates he probably does so because of some other strategy or other needs that are not part of this strategy. So I guess the default behaviour is still sincerity but we don't want to require it.


Ok. It seem

Re: Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-24T21:17:29

From: election-methods-bounces< at >lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces< at >lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Juho
Laatu
Sent: Thursday, May 24, 2012 5:18 AM
To: em Methods
Subject: Re: [EM] Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

On 24.5.2012, at 5.40, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

Juho says:

Some further definitions are however needed. What is the definition of and
how will the voters determine if the election is a u/a election?

[endquote]

I'd replied:

An election is, for you, u/a if, for you, the candidates can be divided into
two sets such that the merit differences within each set are negligible in
comparison to the merit difference between the sets.

Juho says:

Good, we are making progress. Term "u/a" now has a definition 

[endquote]

I first posted that definition months ago, Juho :-)

I've posted it very many times during the past month.

Juho says:

"if, for you, the candidates can be divided into two sets such that the
merit differences within each set

Co-operation/defection in perspective

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-24T19:49:28

The co-operation/defection problem is nothing in comparison to the problems
of Plurality. By comparison, to just have, for a problem, the C/D problem
would be more like not having a problem at all. Think of it as a nuisance,
as opposed to a disasterous distortion that thoroughly conceals public
wishes.

 

The reason why I emphasize it anyway is because it's the only Approval
problem worthy of the name. That's why I say that you can't significantly
improve on Approval unless you gain defection-resistance.

 

And I'll say again that if you think that Condorcet doesn't have the C/D
problem, then just try Condorcet in the 27,24,49 example and the 33,32,34
example.

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

 

 

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Re: Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

Juho Laatu — 2012-05-24T09:18:02


Good, we are making progress. Term "u/a" now has a definition "if, for you, the candidates can be divided into two sets such that the merit differences within each set are negligible in comparison to the merit difference between the sets". Terms "acceptable" and "unacceptable" refer to this definition of "u/a".


It seems to be just a chosen name for the "only acceptable who can beat the unacceptables". It seems that the strategy has a condition that there must be exactly one acceptable candidate that is also a potential winner (for he precondition for the use of the strategy to be true).


We seem to have the same definition.


The reason why I (systematically) request exact and directly implementable definitions is that in order to have a strategy that would work in real life elections we must have a definition that we can print in the newspapers and then expect regular voters to follow. (An alternative would be to have a strategy that we can send to the parties and other interest groups, and based on th

Juho,5/25/12, roughly 2230 UT

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-24T02:40:47

Juho:

 

I'm not going to reply to the repetition and vagueness that constitutes the
rest of your post, but I'll answer this silly question that you've asked.
Your question is silly partly because it asks for a definition that I've
given here many times. But also because it asks if I meant something
different from what I said. ("Silly" is the polite word for the content of
the post to which I'm replying,and your other ones).

 

I'd said:

 

beat the unacceptables, then rank Compromise alone in 1st place.

 

Maybe one can build an implementable strategy from this one. Some further
definitions are however needed. What is the definition of and how will the
voters determine if the election is a u/a election?

 

[endquote]

 

I've many times given definitions of a u/a election. An election is u/a for
you if, for you, it has one or more unacceptable candidates who might win.
And when someone objects that "unacceptable" is undefined,  this is what
I've said: An election is, for you, u/a if, for you, the candi

Re: full-ranking SODA: FBC compliant

Jameson Quinn — 2012-05-23T17:09:31

One more important criterion this system would meet (assuming honest
predeclarations and optimal candidate strategy; this optimal strategy is
unique and knowable, and although it's potentially NP-complete, that
wouldnt be a factor unless there were dozens of potential winners): the
voted Condorcet criterion for any number of candidates.

Also, like prior versions of SODA, this passes later-no-harm for the
candidate with the fewest direct votes (the one whose supporters'
second-choice votes are most important to elicit).

I think that a system which passes FBC and (arguably) Condorcet and a
weakened-but-significant form of LNH is a big deal! This LNH is enough to
ensure that "chicken dilemma" burial problems won't be significant; FBC is
enough to ensure that compromise won't be a problem; so votes will be
honest, and so the Condorcet compliance actually means something.

Note that this system is not of course Condorcet compliant over all voter
preferences, just over the ones they actually express through appr

full-ranking SODA: FBC compliant

Jameson Quinn — 2012-05-23T14:50:45

In SODA (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval), candidates must pre-declare
their preferences among the other candidates, and their post-election
approvals using votes delegated to them[1] must be consistent with these
pre-declared preferences. As defined until now, those pre-declared
preferences were partial orderings; that is, tied preferences were
allowed. I have recently realize that if you require full preference
orderings, SODA's criteria compliances improve significantly. Specifically,
I strongly suspect (though I have not yet fully proven) that it meets all
of the following:

1. FBC
2. There is always some semi-honest vote which meets participation (this is
closely related to FBC, but not quite exactly just a stronger version of it)
3. Participation for up to 4 (5?) candidates
4. Consistency for up to 4 candidates
5. Condorcet and ISDA for up to 4 candidates
6. Local IIA (ie, IIA for the weakest alternative) for up to 5 (or possibly
any number of???) candidates

Sadly, this system still doesn't meet

Re: To Condorcetists:

Juho Laatu — 2012-05-22T22:31:58


In my recent mail, where I studied the Approval strategy that you gave and this example opinion set, I gave some guesses on how the voters might estimate the outcome of the election (expectation).


What is the definition of u/a? Is it needed for the Approval strategy that you gave?


I'm planning to study the strength of that problem when I get the description of the strategy.


I have not thought of that. I'll come back if I find something useful to say on this topic.

Juho



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Two completely different kinds of voting reforms. ICT vsCondorcet.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-22T22:18:11

There are two completely different kinds of voting system reforms:

1. A completely different and new voting system
2. A minimal obvious fix to the current voting system

Our Condorcetists at EM don't seem to get that distinction.

The proposal to repeal Plurality's forced falsification rule follows
obviously from an examination of what's wrong with Plurality, what
Plurality's problem is. It's a type #2 reform, a minimal obvious fix to the
current voting system.

Which of those two kinds of reform proposals do you think would have a
shorter expected enactment time? 

Which one could be considered as a voting-rights case?

Condorcetists keep implying that they don't think that Approval would bring
enough benefit, if I'm correctly guessing what they mean.

I've told of the societal benefits that Approval would bring. I've told why
that is. Anyone should feel free to tell why they believe that isn't so.

But, for now, I'll just add that Myerson & Weber have shown that Approval
would quickly home in on the voter

Re: Juho , 5/21/12, roughly 0800 UT

Juho Laatu — 2012-05-22T22:17:52


I'm sorry if it was not clear enough. I can provide further explanations of the unclear or missing arguments. Just point them out.


Thanks. I think this is the same one that I already got and commented.


I already did so in my recent mail (that starts "Here is a quick analysis...").


Agreed. People tend to do it that way.


Maybe one can build an implementable strategy from this one. Some further definitions are however needed. What is the definition of and how will the voters determine if the election is a u/a election? Also terms "compromise", "acceptable" and "unacceptable" have to be defined. Does "rank Compromise alone in 1st place" mean lifting one of the candidates in the ranked vote to first place while keeping the others as they are?

Juho



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Re: To Condorcetists:

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-22T21:38:27

 

Juho says:

 

Maybe the number one on the list of the still unanswered questions is the
following one.

 

 

[example+question starts here]

 

26: A > B >> C
26: B > A >> C
24: C >> A > B
24: C >> B > A
- A and B are Democrats and C is a Republican

How should voters vote after seeing these (quite reliable) poll results if
they follow the "better than expectation" strategy? Should A and B be seen
as the expected winners with 50% winning chance both? Maybe 50% of the
voters should guess that A wins and 50% that B wins (?).

 

[endquote]

 

You don't say how good a result the various voters expect from the election.
You don't say if it's u/a. You show higher magnitude dislike for C, among
the A and B voters. Should we infer that you mean that it's u/a, and that,
to the A and B voters, A and B are acceptable and B is unacceptable? .that
{A,B} and {C} are sets such that the merit differences within the sets are
negligible in comparison to the merit differences between the sets? If so,
then the Approval's

Re: Juho , 5/21/12, roughly 0800 UT

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-22T21:18:18

Juho says:

 

[Note: Michael Ossipof's message was not a reply to a mail on this list but
to an offline discussion.]

 

On 21.5.2012, at 23.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

 

I don't know what you mean by "all regular voters".

 

I requested strategy descriptions that would be intended for real life
elections and normal voters (not EM experts) in such elections. That means
that the strategy shall be clear enough so that normal voters can implement
it.

 

[endquote]

 

This is just more of the same repetition, and answering it would require me
to repeat answers that I've already given, yet again. I'm not going to. But
there are just a few things that are so outrageously silly that I will
comment.

 

First, in my Approval voting recommendations and descriptions of Approval
strategy, I meant what I said. I don't accept or endorse Juho's strange
interpretations. Those are not what I meant.

You identified two of your examples by giving their "characteristic
numbers", 27,24,49 and 33,32,34. I found and comment

Re: To Condorcetists:

Juho Laatu — 2012-05-22T07:48:28

Here is a quick analysis of the proposed Approval strategy against the Approval example that I gave earlier.

I have two descriptions of the strategy. Their meaning should be the same.
- "Approve the candidates who are better than (or maybe exactly as good as) the result-merit that you expect from the election"
- “Would I rather appoint him/her to office than hold the election?”

Now let's see what will happen in the election where the voters have following approximate poll results (and/or general understanding of the preferences of the voters) available.
26: A > B >> C
26: B > A >> C
24: C >> A > B
24: C >> B > A

Note that if Approval election polls are collected as approvals, the voters wll have less information available for decision makin than this. They could know only the sum of approvals, e.g. A;52, B:52, C:48. But let's assume for now that they have more information that they can use as a basis for their strategic decisions.

First guess of the voters must be that either A or B will win. The exp

Re: Juho , 5/21/12, roughly 0800 UT

Dave Ketchum — 2012-05-22T00:00:56

Thanks Juho, for working to make this dialog more useful!
DWK

On May 21, 2012, at 7:36 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:



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Re: Juho , 5/21/12, roughly 0800 UT

Juho Laatu — 2012-05-21T23:36:39

[Note: Michael Ossipof's message was not a reply to a mail on this list but to an offline discussion.]

On 21.5.2012, at 23.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:


I requested strategy descriptions that would be intended for real life elections and normal voters (not EM experts) in such elections. That means that the strategy shall be clear enough so that normal voters can implement it.


Also strategies that do work only under specific conditions are ok. You just have to write the strategy description so that a regular voter can see when that strategy can be applied and when not. I don't require that a "general" strategy should be used (=modify your vote) in every election. It is enough if there is a strategy that can be applied reasonably often, and that will clearly improve the outcome from that voter's point of view. I encourage you to rewrite the strategy so that it clearly indicates when a voter should use it and how the vote should be modified. A working strategy for public elections must be such that regular v

Typo. Plurality strategy, not Approval strategy,is a difficult problem.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-21T21:25:05

When I said "Approval strategy is a difficult problem", I meant "Plurality
strategy is a difficult problem."

Let me repeat a little of what I said before:

It's difficult because of the difficulty of getting an agreement, among
those who want something better than the Democrats, regarding where they
will combine their Plurality votes.

That's why I suggest just voting sincerely, at least once, to actually find
out what people want.

In a presidential election, or a specified congressional election, or in
specified state elections for specified unimportant offices.

Mike Ossipoff
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Kristofer, contd.

Michael Ossipoff — 2012-05-21T21:16:54

This is my reply to the remainder of Kristofer's post:

Enough voters feel like this, and there would be a backlash.

[endquote]

Approval doesn't have a problem that Plurality doesn't have. You
haven't shown one, you know.

What you're saying above is just that you want a rank method, and that
you want to express all of your preferences.

If that's what you'd most like, then I recommend ICT.

But just fixing Pluruality's ridiculous rating-falisification
requirement would a lot more enactable, and would bring enormous
societal improvement.

You can dither forever, arguing about what is the ideal best. Dither
all you want to, because the voting system reforms are being
considered for here, not for there (No one claims that they're needed
there).

By the way, you spoke of how you vote in your PR elections. Since
you've opened the door to that topic, then which party do you vote
for?

Kristofer says:

Approval would in that respect then be like IRV: appearing sensible when
you have two + minor parties, but in a