http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general hourly 1 1901-01-01T00:00+00:00 http://gmane.org/img/gmane-25t.png http://gmane.org http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14655 <pre>Several people have complained to me that they get their email for the list sent from a different address than the one they send from and that their mail has bounced as a result. To take care of this, on your own, just add a second account using the web interface and click the "no mail" option. You will then be able to mail to the list from that address but you won't get mail to it. For those that asked, this isn't a normal Mailman feature -- I hacked it in with a Postfix policy daemon so it happens at the MTA dialog. It is necessary because the list gets hundreds and sometimes thousands of spam attempts a day and I didn't want to deal with the mail queues being clogged with thousands of bounce messages that would never be delivered Perry </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-11T00:17:06 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14654 <pre> . . . unless the person trying to crack the password treats the password as a "passphrase" like the user does, and uses combinations of common words rather than strings of random letters to try to crack the password. The problem is that "~44 bits of entropy" here assumes the person trying to crack the password is using the simplest possible means of brute force cracking, and is not clever enough to consider the possibility that there may be patterns of character selection based on terms in the English language. The "correct horse battery staple" example imposes patterns on password generation that do not exist in, say, "gCac2 RY9%sK%/3Q2!P}&gt;p2?'H1q?". I find it frankly shocking that most of the people in the world trying to come up with a clever trick to get around using strong passwords simply do not think about the fact that when the characters in your password have predictable relationships to one another (e.g., Y9%sK as a pattern appears in no natural language word, but horse certainly does appear, an</pre> Chad Perrin 2011-08-10T17:29:00 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14653 <pre> FWIW, http://tim.dierks.org/2007/03/secure-in-browser-javascript-password.html - Tim _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography&lt; at &gt;metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography </pre> Tim Dierks 2011-08-10T16:17:45 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14652 <pre> More precisely, Blackberry email is encrypted from the recipient's Exchange server to the mobile device. The scenario is corporate email; the business case is that RIM could claim that they *couldn't* read the email; they never had it in the clear. However, that's only true for that service. For personal Blackberries, there is no corporate-owned server doing the encryption. The service in question here, though, is Blackberry Messenger. There seems to be some confusion about whether or not such messages are encrypted, and if so under what circumstances. One link (http://www.berryreview.com/2010/08/06/faq-blackberry-messenger-pin-messages-are-not-encrypted/) says that they're not, in any meaningful form. More authoritatively, http://web.archive.org/web/20101221211610/http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/its-sti/publications/itsb-bsti/itsb57a-eng.html says that they aren't. The most authoritative source is RIM itself. P 27 of http://docs.blackberry.com/16650/ confirms the CSE document. Looking at things more abs</pre> Steven Bellovin 2011-08-10T18:35:56 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14651 <pre> On Aug 10, 2011, at 10:12 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: You still need a password manager to remember which of the dozens of easily-remembered passwords you used, so you might as well just use the 20-character random generator they all have. Not bad for a stopgap if you're caught needing to make one up on the fly though. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography&lt; at &gt;metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography </pre> Adam Fields 2011-08-10T14:30:59 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14650 <pre> Blackberry already more or less has that functionality, which disproves your hypothesis. Perry </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-10T16:19:53 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14649 <pre>On Wed, 10 Aug 2011 11:53:11 -0400 Ken Buchanan &lt;ken.buchanan&lt; at &gt;gmail.com&gt; wrote: Funny, that, since Sampo's proposal is more or less how Blackberry chat actually works. (Various previous posters had the details wrong.) Also all blackberry corporate services work without RIM having any access to the content -- they only get access to email for individual users for whom they terminate the encrypted tunnel. Perry </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-10T16:13:32 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14648 <pre>Our (Sandy Clark, Travis Goodspeed, Perry Metzger, Zachary Wasserman, Kevin Xu and me) Usenix Security paper on vulnerabilities in the P25 two-way radio system (used by public safety agencies in the US and elsewhere) is out today. See http://www.crypto.com/papers/p25sec.pdf for the paper (pdf format) and http://www.crypto.com/p25 for a summary of mitigations. -matt _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography&lt; at &gt;metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography </pre> Matt Blaze 2011-08-10T16:06:48 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14647 <pre> For a single password on a system with flexible rules, it's good advice. Real world, with a dozen non-reused passwords needed on systems with limited password lengths, not so much. "correct stable horse battery"? </pre> Steve Furlong 2011-08-10T14:22:46 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14646 <pre>Today's XKCD is on password strength. The advice it gives is pretty good in principle... http://xkcd.com/936/ </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-10T14:12:07 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14645 <pre> Thus, why not turn the Trusted Computing idea on its head? Simply make P2P public key cryptography available to your customers, and then bind your hands behind your back in an Odysseian fasion, using hardware means? Simply make it impossible for even yourself to circumvent the best cryptographic protocol you can invent, which you embed in your device before ever unveiling it, and then just live with it? Thus the need for credible precommitment, TC-style, at the hardware level.. </pre> Sampo Syreeni 2011-08-10T00:02:28 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14644 <pre> IIRC this came up last year when a Middle Eastern country (I forget which) were threatening to not let RIM operate unless they could intercept blackberry messages. However, as was pointed out then, apparently the encryption is to &amp; from RIM's servers, not the recipient. So RIM have access to all the 'secret' messages. I expect GCHQ &amp; the Met will make sure said systems are patched in to their surveillance programme in no time. Unfortunately the present climate in England is such that I can't imagine such measures being anything but lauded. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography&lt; at &gt;metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography </pre> Nick 2011-08-09T20:59:42 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14643 <pre>http://www.cio.com.au/article/396417/ Quoting. Crypto starts being mentioned in the fourth paragraph: India's communications ministry has been asked by the home ministry to monitor social networking websites such as Twitter and Facebook amid fears that the services are being used by terrorists to plan attacks. The request suggests that the Indian government is trying to broaden the scope of its online surveillance for national security. Telecommunications service providers in India provide facilities for lawful interception and monitoring of communications on their network, including communications from social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter, in accordance with their license agreements,[...] But there are certain communications which are encrypted, Deora said Friday. The government did not provide details of what encrypted data they would like to have access to. A spokesman for the home ministry said on Monday that additional information can only be prov</pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-09T18:20:37 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14642 <pre>The list has been alive again only for a couple of days, but it appears that I need to post this oldie again. ------------ A3: Please. Q3: Should I avoid top posting on this mailing list? A2: Because, by reversing the order of a conversation, it leaves the reader without much context, and makes them read a message in an unnatural order. Q2: Why is top posting irritating? A1: It is the practice of putting your reply to a message before the quoted message, instead of after the (trimmed) message. Q1: What is top posting? Top Posting FAQ: </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-09T18:06:33 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14641 <pre>Quoting from the New York Times: David Lammy, Britain's intellectual property minister, also called for a suspension of Blackberry's encrypted instant message service. Many rioters, exploiting that service, had been able to organize mobs and outrun the police, who were ill-equipped to monitor it. "It is unfortunate, but for the very short term, London can't have a night like the last," Mr. Lammy said in a Twitter post. Officials at Research in Motion, the corporate parent of Blackberry, declined to comment on whether the service would be suspended. But the company, based in Waterloo, Ontario, issued a statement saying: "We feel for those impacted by recent days' riots in London. We have engaged with the authorities to assist in any way we can." http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/world/europe/10britain.html </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-09T17:18:38 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14640 <pre>----- Forwarded message from Jeffrey Walton &lt;noloader&lt; at &gt;gmail.com&gt; ----- From: Jeffrey Walton &lt;noloader&lt; at &gt;gmail.com&gt; Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2011 20:00:56 -0400 To: Randombit List &lt;cryptography&lt; at &gt;randombit.net&gt; Subject: [cryptography] OT: RSA's Pwnie Award Reply-To: noloader&lt; at &gt;gmail.com, Crypto discussion list &lt;cryptography&lt; at &gt;randombit.net&gt; In case anyone is interested, RSA won a Pwnie for lamest vendor response for its RSA SecurID token compromise: http://pwnies.com/winners/ _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography&lt; at &gt;randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- </pre> Eugen Leitl 2011-08-09T11:52:09 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14639 <pre> Here's the accompanying technical article: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/405 They only implemented a "somewhat-homomorphic" encryption scheme, though. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography&lt; at &gt;metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography </pre> Jonathan Katz 2011-08-09T01:46:14 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14638 <pre>Two years after Dr. Craig Gentry of IBM published the proof for fully homomorphic encryption, Microsoft has come up with a prototype that utilizes the technique: http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/38239/page1/ saqib http://redscarfvestpink.appspot.com/ _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography&lt; at &gt;metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography </pre> Ali, Saqib 2011-08-08T19:37:15 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14637 <pre>On Mon, 8 Aug 2011 03:31:00 +0200 "R. Hirschfeld" &lt;ray&lt; at &gt;unipay.nl&gt; wrote: If you had the stuff in mbox format it would be great -- that's what Mailman slurps in for old archives. Is it a complete archive though? Perry </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-08T01:59:33 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14636 <pre>Please ignore. (For those that don't ignore these thins, hopefully VERPs should now be on. No, you have no reason to know what that means if you're not someone who runs mailing lists.) </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-08T00:31:21 http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.general/14635 <pre>Please ignore, I am testing bounce processing. </pre> Perry E. Metzger 2011-08-08T00:16:12 Search the mailing list at Gmane query http://search.gmane.org/?group=$group=gmane.comp.encryption.general